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Abstract—The security issues facing quantum key dis-
tribution (QKD) are explained, herein focusing on those
issues that are cryptographic and information theoretic in
nature and not those based on physics. The problem of
security criteria is addressed. It is demonstrated that an
attacker’s success probabilities are the fundamental criteria
of security that any theoretic security criterion must relate
to in order to have operational significance. The errors
committed in the prevalent interpretation of the trace
distance criterion are analyzed. The security proofs of QKD
protocols are discussed and assessed in regard to three main
features: their validity, completeness, and adequacy of the
achieved numerical security level. Problems are identified
in all these features. It appears that the QKD security
situation is quite different from the common perception
that a QKD-generated key is nearly perfectly secure. Built
into our discussion is a simple but complete quantitative
description of the information theoretic security of classical
key distribution that is also applicable to the quantum
situation. In the appendices, we provide a brief outline of
the history of some major QKD security proofs, a rather
unfavorable comparison of current QKD proven security
with that of conventional symmetric key ciphers, and a list
of objections and answers concerning some major points
of the paper.
PACS #: 03.67Dd
This paper is to appear in IEEE Access
I. INTRODUCTION
Quantum key distribution (QKD) involves the gener-
ation of a shared secret key between two parties via
quantum signal transmission [1], [2]. (Among other
possible terms, we will often use the more appropriate
“generation” in lieu of “distribution,” ignoring their
fine distinction in conventional cryptography [3].) QKD
is widely perceived to have been proved secure in
various protocols [1], [2], in contrast to the lack of
security proofs for conventional methods of encryption
for privacy or key distribution. Security proofs in QKD
are highly technical and are also multi-disciplinary in
nature, as is the case with the subject area of quantum
cryptography itself. Theoretical QKD involves in its de-
scription and treatment various areas in quantum physics,
information theory, and cryptography at an abstract and
conceptual level. It is difficult for non-experts in QKD
security to make sense of the literature; moreover, even
experts are often not aware of certain basics in some of
the relevant fields. Many who perform assessments on
QKD security follow the vague community consensus
on QKD security being guaranteed by rigorous proofs. A
common perception is that QKD gives “perfect secrecy,”
as asserted for example in a useful recent monograph on
conventional cryptography [3, p. 589]. It is interesting
to This paper is to appear in IEEE Access note that
QKD is commonly taught to physics students as being an
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important application of quantum optics because QKD
is provably secure. To our knowledge, the provable
security property is often taught as being self evident
and is not questioned on any level (recent advances in
quantum hacking may be an exception; however, such
attacks are based on discrepancies between the model
and real systems as opposed to the security of the model
itself). The commonly cited reason for no-cloning or
quantum entanglement is very far from sufficient. Even
in the technical literature, a QKD-generated key is often
regarded as perfect whenever it is used in an application.
One main purpose of this paper is to correct such a
misconception and to demonstrate how the imperfect
generated key affects the security proofs themselves.
Security proofs by their nature are conceptual, logical
and mathematical yet indispensable for guaranteeing
security. Cryptographic security cannot be guaranteed
by experiment, if only because possible attack scenarios
cannot be exhausted via experiment. However, security
is a most serious issue in cryptography and must be
thoroughly and carefully analyzed [4, two prefaces and
ch. 1; see also quotes in Appendix I]. The burden of
proof is on one who makes the security claim, not on
others to produce specific successful general attacks.
In this paper, we will describe the actual security
theory situation of QKD with just enough technical
materials for accurate statements on the results. We will
be able to describe some main security issues without
going into the physics, and we can treat everything at a
classical probability level, to which a quantum descrip-
tion invariably reduces. We will discuss in what ways
these security issues have been handled inadequately.
Some major work in the QKD security literature will be
mentioned and also discussed in Appendix I, which may
help clarify the issues and illuminate the development
that led to the current security situation. In Appendix
II, we compare QKD to conventional cryptography and
provide a preliminary assessment on the usefulness of
QKD when conventional cryptography appears adequate.
(Note that cryptography is a small and relatively minor
subarea of computer security [4]. It is the latter that
results in news headlines.) In Appendix III, some pos-
sible objections to certain points of this paper from the
viewpoint of the current QKD literature are answered.
Table 1 in Section VIII.B gives a summary comparison
of various numerical values.
Generally, perfect security cannot be obtained in
any key distribution scheme with security dependent
on physical characteristics due to system imperfections
mixed with the attacker’s disturbance, which must be
considered in the security model. This is especially
the case with QKD, which involves small signal lev-
els. We use the term “QKD” in this paper to refer
to protocols with security depending on information-
disturbance tradeoffs [1], [2], excluding those based on
other principles such as the “KCQ” approach in [5],
which permits stronger signals and for which no general
security proof has yet been claimed. In QKD, one can at
best generate a key that is close to perfect in some sense.
This immediately raises the issue of a security criterion,
its operational significance and its quantitative level.
Security is very much a quantitative issue. Quantitative
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security is quite hard to properly define and to rigorously
evaluate; thus, there are few such results in the literature
on conventional mathematics-based cryptography. It is at
least as hard in physics-based cryptography, and there is
yet no true valid quantification of QKD security under
all possible attacks.
That there are problems and gaps in QKD security
proofs has been discussed since 2003 in [6, App. A],
[7], [5, App. A and B], [8], culminating in the numerical
adequacy issue in [9] in 2012, which provides the trace
distance criterion level for a so-called “near-perfect” key.
This last numerical adequacy point is emphasized in
[10], and a reply is given in [11], which in turn is
replied to in [12]; no further exchange on this topic has
resulted. The basic point of [11] is that a trace distance
level of 10−20 is sufficient for security. There have
since been several arXiv papers that elaborate upon the
several QKD security issues that have yet to be resolved.
This paper summarizes and supersedes those papers
in a coherent framework for analyzing QKD security.
This paper shows in what ways, even at a value of
10−20, which is ten orders of magnitude beyond what is
currently achievable, such a trace distance level does not
provide adequate security guarantees in a cryptosystem
that involves the use of a vast number of keys at such a
level; see Section VIII.
Before proceeding to a detailed treatment, we list
the major problems of currently available QKD security
proofs as follows:
(i) The chosen security criterion, namely, a quantum
trace distance d, has been misinterpreted. The op-
erational security guarantee that it yields does not
cover some important security concerns.
(ii) The numerical security level that has been obtained
is far from adequate. The very strong level of guar-
antee asserted recently is derived from erroneous
reasoning.
(iii) The known security proofs are not complete nor
justified at various stages in a valid manner, espe-
cially in connection with the major necessary step
of error correction, which has not been treated in a
rigorous manner.
(iv) A trace distance level guarantee of a key K limits
the information-theoretic security level that can be
obtained when K is used for message authentica-
tion, taking away an otherwise available security
parameter that allows arbitrarily high levels of mes-
sage authentication security.
There are many other serious issues facing QKD
security proofs, many of which relating to physics and
implementation. These issues will not be discussed in
this paper, which concentrates on a careful exposition of
the above four points.
Much of the technical content in this paper is concep-
tual analysis, especially on the use of probability in real-
world applications. The applications are not essentially
mathematical or physical in nature, which is partly why
they are easy to miss and result in various confusions.
Sections III.A, IV, V.C, VIII.B, and Appendix III contain
relevant clarifications on the subtle meaning of proba-
bility in real-world applications. Note that knowledge
of physics, classical or quantum, is not required to
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Figure 1. Additive stream cipher in which the running key sequence
{ki} may or may not be uniformly distributed.
understand the content of this paper. Furthermore, the
relevant basic cryptography concepts will be explained
when being introduced.
II. CONVENTIONAL AND QUANTUM CRYPTOGRAPHY
We briefly review the different representations of
conventional and quantum cryptography in regard to the
cryptographic goals of privacy and key distribution [3].
In Fig. 1, the conventional stream cipher encryption
of a data sequence x = {xj} for privacy is depicted. A
user Alice transmits y = {yi}, which is the xor of the
data bits xi and running key bits ki for each i:
Yi = Xi ⊕Ki (1)
We use uppercase to denote random variables and lower
case to denote the values they take on. Thus, from (1),
Alice transmits yi = xi ⊕ ki for given xi and ki. A
prior shared key bit sequence k = {ki} unknown to the
attacker Eve is known to Alice and the other user Bob,
who can decrypt xi = yi⊕ki from yi by knowing ki. The
attacker Eve would then learn nothing about X from Y
without knowing something about K. She knows nothing
about K when the Ki are (statistically) independent
bits with equal probability of being 0 or 1. In this
so-called “one-time pad” encryption, her probability of
obtaining the sequence X correctly given that she knows
Y through interception is equal to her a priori probability
on X . For uniformly distributed X ,
p(x|y) = 2−n (2)
where n = |X| = |Y | = |K| is the bit length of the se-
quences. (The vertical bar |·| is always used in this paper
to denote the bit length of the sequence within it. Lower
case p(·) are discrete probability distributions, and no
continuous distributions will be used.) We may represent
this by K = U , namely, the uniform random variable to
Eve. Thus, in addition to p(xi|yi) = 1/2, which is the a
priori probability of each Xi, there is also no correlation
of any type between the Xis that Eve can find. This is
“perfect secrecy.” The security under discussion is the
information-theoretic security of the intrinsic uncertainty
to Eve. (See Section III and Appendix II.) The correla-
tion among bits in K is a most important feature often
missed in cryptography, especially in connection with
the trace distance (statistical distance) criterion, which
is presented in Section IV.A and also in Section IV.B in
the context of distinguishability.
The goal of QKD is to generate a key K, which
ideally is K = U , by transmitting bits X ′ from Alice
to Bob via quantum signals with no use of shared secret
keys. In reality, a prior shared secret key is needed to
start executing the QKD protocol, at least for message
authentication against man-in-the-middle attacks.
The QKD key generation process is depicted in Fig.
4
Figure 2. Schematic representation of a QKD system incorporating
error correction and privacy amplification with generated key K.
2. For definiteness, the original BB84 protocol [1] is
schematically described in the following, which contains
the key idea of QKD. A sequence of quantum optical
signals is modulated by the data X ′ and sent from Alice
to Bob, with each bit X ′i modulating a separate quantum
signal. (We use X ′ to distinguish these key generation
data from the data X on which the QKD key K is used to
encrypt, as in Fig. 1.) In BB84, each quantum signal is a
single photon in a so-called “qubit”, a two-dimensional
quantum state space. Eve could intercept and set her
probe on the qubits during signal transmission. Bob
measures on one of the two BB84 bases randomly upon
receiving each qubit signal and obtains a bit value of
0 or 1. After the entire sequence is measured, Bob
publicly announces which basis he measured on each i,
and the ones “mismatched” to Alice’s transmitted signal
are discarded. Then, a portion of the remaining matched
ones is used to check the frequency of bit error, which
is called the quantum bit error rate (QBER). The other
portion is called the sifted key K ′′ from which the final
key K is to be generated.
For our purposes, there is no need to understand
the exact physics and underlying rationale of the above
procedure. The only thing that matters for the purposes
of this paper is the representation of Eve’s knowledge on
the generated K via her final classical observed value Y
by the joint distribution p(k, y). Eve’s probe inevitably
disturbs the quantum signals if she learns anything
from the probe, a characteristic quantum effect of the
information-disturbance tradeoff, which has no classical
analog. It is usually assumed that the users would regard
all disturbance as indicated by the QBER level to be
from Eve’s interception. They would estimate how much
“information” Eve can learn about X ′ with such a
disturbance. (The vague word “information” would be
specified precisely in context.) The users have to correct
the errors in K ′′ to obtain a useful key K. Such errors
would always be present from system imperfections due
to the low signal level. Error correction is typically ac-
complished by an ordinary error correcting code (ECC)
on K ′′, as indicated in Fig. 2. The users then transfer
the estimate of Eve’s information on K ′′ to the error-
free K ′. If Eve’s information is below a certain threshold
level, the users may employ “privacy amplification” [1]
on K ′ to eliminate it. The privacy amplification code
(PAC) usually involves linear hashing compression [3]
on K ′ to a final generated key K with bit length |K|,
which is a small fraction of |K ′|.
What is the security desired and claimed for the
QKD-generated key K? Because this is a physical and
in particular a quantum cryptosystem, there are many
mutually exclusive different observed values Y that Eve
could obtain from her choice of quantum probe and
based on the quantum measurement on the probe. She
could estimate various properties of K from the Y that
she obtains, each with a certain probability of success.
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She also would gather side information relevant to im-
proving her estimates before she measures her probe and
makes estimates. Such side information would include
the BB84 bases open announcement and the specific
PAC employed in the QKD round. It may also involve
the specific ECC used. The users’ goal is to make Eve’s
probability of success in obtaining any characteristic of
K close to the level whereby K is perfect, i.e., when
K = U .
An especially significant attack on privacy encryption
is the known-plaintext attack (KPA), which is the main
vulnerability of conventional mathematics-based encryp-
tion. The ciphertext-only attack, for which X = U to
Eve, that QKD security analyses focus upon is usually
not considered as a serious risk for symmetric-key ci-
phers [3], [4], [8], which can be further substantiated
in an information-theoretic manner. A brief summary
is given in Appendix II, which compares QKD with
conventional cryptography. A KPA runs as follows.
Eve may know a portion of the data X that is
encrypted with K and hence knows part of K because
Y is open. She may then learn something about the
remainder of K through correlations among the bits in
an imperfect K and hence something about the unknown
portion of X . It is such a KPA when a QKD key is
being used that must be protected against. This implies
that correlations between bits in K must be addressed
in QKD security.
Thus, perfect secrecy against all attack possibilities
would require that K is uniformly distributed to Eve for
any Y that she may possibly obtain that is allowed by
the laws of quantum physics together with all her side
information. Thus far, a security criterion is chosen to
measure the difference between an imperfect key and a
perfect key with a quantitative security level. The term
unconditional security was coined [13] and widely used
to include the following two conditions:
Unconditional Security:
(i) complete generality on possible attacks;
(ii) quantitative security level can be made as close to
perfect as desired.
The data bit length |X ′| or |K| in a QKD round is
often taken to be a security parameter s, namely, the
quantitative security level improves with increasing s and
becomes perfect as s→∞ [13].
Such unconditional security for QKD is often claimed
because it distinguishes QKD from conventional cryp-
tography; moreover, it is the only advantage of QKD
(See Appendix II). Security against only some attacks
means that the QKD approach may not lead to good se-
curity in the future when other attacks become practical.
The latter is often taken to be the situation with con-
ventional cryptography. Unconditional security in QKD
remains asserted on occasion, both theoretically for a
given protocol and physical models and experimentally
as potential or even actualized possibility. However, no
security parameter has ever been found for any QKD
protocol at any key generation rate, and certainly, |X ′|
and |K| are not such parameters, as will be shown in
Section III.B.
To explain the process and requirements of a secu-
rity proof, we proceed to quantitatively describe the
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information-theoretic security of a cryptosystem.
III. OPERATIONAL SECURITY LEVEL OF A SECRET
BIT STRING
It is sometimes asserted that a cryptographic security
criterion is a matter of “definition” and “interpretation,”
although this is highly misleading and can be considered
incorrect. There are definite specific characteristics in
a cryptographic goal on which users want to protect
against successful attacks. A security criterion would
be inadequate for a security task it is supposed to
serve if it does not lead to a guarantee at an adequate
quantitative level. The range of adequate levels may
depend on the specific application; however, one cannot
sensibly “define” a protocol to be secure if its security
criterion and level do not cover such possible attacks.
“Interpretation” of a mathematical statement, on security
or any other matter, may be correct or incorrect when it is
applied to a real-world situation. Moreover, there have
been many erroneous interpretations in QKD security
analysis. These errors are mainly conceptual errors, not
mathematical nor mainly mathematical mistakes. These
errors often involve reading ordinary meanings into a
word that in context is a technical term that carries only
a precise technical meaning. We will see many examples
of these errors in Sections III to VIII of this paper.
The operationally or empirically meaningful security
criteria on the secrecy of any shared key string K for
privacy or key distribution, whether it is generated by
QKD or any method, are the attacker Eve’s probabilities
or rates of success in correctly obtaining various parts
or characteristics of K, including K itself in its entirety.
This is the case even in complexity-based security, as
we will see.
A. Why Probability Criteria are Needed
The quantitative information-theoretic security of a
key K is often described by a single-number security
criterion, such as Eve’s Shannon mutual information
I(K;Y ) on K [14] through her observation Y , which
she may obtain by intercepting the signal transmission.
This I(K;Y ) is defined [14] from the joint distribution
p(k, y) = p(y|k)p(k), where p(k) is the distribution of
the generated K obtained by the users under a given
quantum probe from Eve. The conditional probability
p(y|k) is specified through the cryptosystem represen-
tation and Eve’s measurement result, from which she
derives her estimate of a characteristic C(k), denoted
by Cˆ(k), which is a function of y. For example, from
y, she could estimate C(k) = k as Kˆ(y). Because she
takes Kˆ to be K, we can simplify our notation by simply
writing K itself instead of Kˆ, i.e., K is being observed
from Eve’s viewpoint. Thus, p(y|k) gives the conditional
probability that the y observed by Eve given k is the
actual key generated. Eve can now derive p(k|y) for all
possible k through p(y|k) and Bayes’ rule.
The criterion I(K;Y ) gives the number of Shannon
bits I(K;Y ) concerning K known to Eve because, in
this case, one can write
I(K;Y ) = |K| −H(K|Y ) (3)
where H(K|Y ) is the conditional entropy of K given
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Y [14]. Note that, as we just indicated, Eve has a
full distribution on her knowledge of K given any
observation y with the conditional distribution p(k|y).
We may assume that all the side information that Eve
may possess has been considered in her final p(k|y).
We order the N = 2|K| possible values of K entering
p(k|y) and suppress its y dependence so that, in various
abbreviated notations, Eve has p(k|y) ≡ {pi} ≡ P with
p1 ≥ p2 ≥ ..... ≥ pN (4)
This probability profile is the complete “information”
Eve has on K given her observation y. Any single
number criterion, such as I(K;Y ), merely expresses a
constraint on P . When I(K;Y ) = 0, we have P = U ,
and Eve knows nothing about X . For a given level
I(K;Y ) =  > 0, what does this imply for the security
of K?
This question arises for any criterion that is used
as a theoretic quantity. A single-number information-
theoretic measure on the uncertainty or “information”
is a theoretical quantity whose operational or empirical
meaning needs to be independently explained [15, pref-
ace]. In the context of ordinary communications, the two
theoretic quantities entropy and mutual information are
related to the empirical data rate and error rate through
the Shannon Source and Channel Coding Theorems.
What would be the operational meaning of these quanti-
ties in the context of cryptography? One cannot simply
assume the word “information” for a technical concept
would carry its ordinary meaning in any application, es-
pecially not quantitatively. Shannon himself emphasized
such a danger early on [16]. In Shannon’s cryptography
paper [17], he used such information measures; however,
except for the ideal case of I(X;Y ) = 0 for a one-time
pad, he did not explain their operational cryptographic
significance.
In cryptography, one is concerned that Eve should not
be able to correctly estimate various quantities associated
with a key K from her observation and side information.
Such success is generally obtained only probabilistically.
Therefore, this operational security requirement trans-
lates to Eve not being able to estimate such quantities
well, i.e., not with appreciable probability. In the case
of perfect secrecy, Eve’s P above equals the uniform U .
Therefore, in the general imperfect case, her estimate
probabilities as derived from P should be close to that
derived from U . In particular, the exact level needs to be
quantitatively compared to that from U and its numerical
adequacy to ensure security for a given application.
Thus, given a security criterion level that sets a
constraint on P above, we would need to ascertain
what success probabilities Eve may possibly obtain.
Specifically, we would compare the p1 from any p(k|y)
not ruled out by the security criterion constraint to the
K = U level:
p1(K) vs U(k) = 2−n (5)
We use the notation p1(K) to explicitly demonstrate
that the p1 level refers to the K with a distribution
p(k|y). Clearly, p1(K), Eve’s maximum probability of
correctly obtaining K, needs to be sufficiently small for
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any meaningful claim to security even if it may be far
larger than the 2−n level. We would address such a
general security probability guarantee based on security
measures in Sections IV and V. Their connections to
the numerical security levels of concrete protocols are
discussed in Section VIII.
When K is used to encrypt data X , part of X may be
known to Eve in a KPA, as discussed in Section II. Let
K1 be the subsequence of K known to Eve, say, when K
is used as a one-time pad, and let K∗2 be a subsequence
of K2, K2 being the remainder of K excluding K1.
Then, Eve’s optimal success probabilities from such an
attack should be compared to the perfect security level
when K = U ,
p1(K
∗
2 |K1 = k1) versus p1(U∗2 |U1 = u1) = 2−|U
∗
2 |
(6)
where U1, U2, and U∗2 are the sequences obtained from
U with the same bit positions as K1, K2, and K∗2 ,
respectively. In general, Eve may possess only statistical
information on X without knowing part of it exactly. We
will not address this more complicated situation in this
paper.
It is important to note that we may write
(OG) operational guarantee for an event =
rule out its possible occurrence with a high proba-
bility
An average number of occurrences (sample mean) is
not an operational guarantee because the number of
occurrence is itself a random quantity from a finite
number of trials, each of which has the same probability
distribution. This does not mean that an average cannot
be used as a measure of security. It means that an average
is a less accurate measure compared to a probability
statement on individual occurrences or on a multiple-
use sample mean. If the variance is known in addition
to the average (mean), the probability statement on the
sample mean can be made, and operational guarantees
can be restored. If only the average is known, the Markov
inequality can be used to provide an accurate individual
probability statement, as shown in Section V.C.
Complexity-based security is operationally equivalent
to the following success probability characterization. Let
M be the total number of possibilities that Eve can
attempt computationally among the N = 2n possible
K values to determine if a particular value is the correct
value, as in opening a safe. It is easy to show that, with
a uniform chance of success for each trial, her overall
probability of success is, for a uniform probability dis-
tribution on the N possible cases,
p1(K) = p(k) = M/N (7)
Eq. (7) can be readily generalized when Eve’s success
probability for each trial is not uniform but known [5].
Indeed, it can be observed that there is no difference
between complexity-based security and information-
theoretic (probabilistic) security if Eve is given a suffi-
cient number of attempts to determine the correctness of
a given k, as in the case of cracking a safe. She would
need at most N trials and on average N/2 trials. The
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problem of complexity-based security is that it is very
hard to prove a lower bound on the number of trials Eve
needs for a given problem, and no such proof exists for
any common problem. It will be observed that it is also
very hard to prove QKD security, and no such proof yet
exists as well.
B. The Mutual Information Criterion
In the literature on classical noise-based key gener-
ation within information-theoretic security [18], [19],
[20], both before and after the emergence of QKD in
1984 [21], the security criterion used is the mutual infor-
mation I(K;Y ) between the generated key K and Eve’s
observation Y . No relation of this information-theoretic
quantity to Eve’s operational success probability was
given until [5]. The issue will be discussed further
in the next section in connection with the statistical
distance criterion. Here, we would like to remove a major
misconception about security proofs that use the mutual
information criterion, first discussed in Appendix A of
ref [5] and which directly carries over to the QKD case
for the d criterion as well [5], [22].
Apart from the problem of bounding p1(K) from
I(K;Y ), the latter we will abbreviate as IE , the asymp-
totic security proofs that show, with |K| = n,
IE → 0 as n→∞ (8)
were erroneously supposed as proofs that K is asymp-
totically perfect. That is confusing the meaning of a limit
because∞ is not a number. What occurs here is that the
convergence rate of IE to 0 determines the asymptotic
security level as follows. From Lemma 2 in [5], for any
l < n, it is possible that
IE/n ∼ 2−l with p1(K) ∼ 2−l (9)
Eq. (9) states that, under the constraint of a given level
of I(K;Y ), there are possible p(k) with p1 at the same
quantitative level as IE/n. Thus, a very insecure K,
compared to U , can satisfy (8), even when IE converges
exponentially in n:
IE = 2
−(λn−logn) (10)
for a constant λ. It is possible given Eq. (10) that
p1(K) ∼ 2−λn for λ  1, as compared to 2−n for
a uniform key. Apart from condition (i) of unconditional
security in Section II, such an asymptotic proof of (8)
does not imply condition (ii) for unconditional security.
Indeed, it does not even imply K is in any sense near
perfect, as the above case (10) shows. We may mention
that the current quantum criterion d suffers from the
same exponential problem as will be discussed in the
following section. Although d can be directly used in
a finite n protocol, this exponential problem is why
relatively large and insecure levels of d are obtained in
a real protocol with sizable key rates.
The quantum generalization of IE is called “accessible
information”, which is the maximum mutual informa-
tion I(K;Y ) that Eve can obtain from any quantum
measurement on her probe. Such an additional issue of
measurement optimization is characteristic of quantum
detection [23], [24]. This issue plays no role in our
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context after we take IE to be Eve’s accessible infor-
mation so that the quantum security situation reduces
to a classical one under such IE . The early proofs
of QKD security up until 2004 are based on the use
of such an accessible information criterion as well as
the current proof on the so-called measurement-device-
independent approach [25]. Thus, the proofs all suffer
directly from the problems explained above and remain
in error even after the proof is converted to one with the
trace distance criterion. A particularly influential early
security proof is given in [26], which is the basis of the
heuristic generalizations used to include various system
imperfections in [27]. The side information that Eve has
from the open announcement of ECC and PAC of Fig. 2
are considered in the proofs of [13], [26], [27]. In Section
VII, we will discuss how they considered in more recent
proofs and what problems are yet to be resolved.
IV. THE TRACE DISTANCE SECURITY CRITERION d
AND ITS SECURITY MEANING
The mutual information criterion does not di-
rectly guarantee security against known-plaintext attacks
(KPA). We require bounds on the conditional probability
(6) when part of K, namely, K1, is known to Eve so
that correlation between the bits in K will not leak
much information about K2, namely, the remainder of
K. In QKD, this KPA problem is considered as one of
“universal composition” [28], [29], [30] in which the
security when K is being used in an application is
taken to be a “composition” security issue. Although
KPA security is crucial and is the usual concern of
privacy in conventional ciphers, as noted above, it was
not addressed or discussed in the QKD literature until
ref [28] twenty years after ref [21] appeared. This topic
was addressed in [28] as a composition security issue,
with the conclusion that security is ensured when the
accessible information goes to 0 exponentially in |K|.
That is directly contradicted by (10) above even simply
for ciphertext-only attack security.
Then, in ref [31], it was noted in a specific counter-
example that a single-bit KPA leak is possible under the
accessible information criterion due to the phenomenon
of “quantum information locking”, and the trace distance
criterion d was proposed as an improved criterion (the d
criterion was also discussed in [28]) with the claim that,
under d ≤ , the probability that K is not perfect is at
most . Specifically, d is claimed to be the maximum
probability that the generated K is not perfect, such
probability being called the failure probability. Appar-
ently, the accessible information criterion is much worse.
Under such a criterion, knowing log |K| number of bits
in K may fully reveal the remainder of K [32].
Such a maximum failure probability interpretation of
d, as originally given in [29], [30] and continuously
maintained in many subsequent papers and in the general
review [2], is incorrect; however, it has been maintained
publicly in the QKD community to date, despite its flaw
having been revealed and explained in early 2009 [33],
[34], in [5] and [8], and in several arXiv papers until
the Fall of 2014 in [22]. Only in ref [35] is such an
interpretation vaguely combined with a correct security
consequence of d (Eq. (14) below) but with no acknowl-
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edgment of previous errors. Part of the reason is likely
that the “indistinguishability advantage” interpretation of
d is employed instead for validation of this incorrect
interpretation, which serves to justify QKD security that
cannot be otherwise obtained. In Sections IV and V, we
will treat this issue in detail to identify the major security
issues involved and those that have not been resolved
with the d criterion.
There are two different derivations of the failure prob-
ability interpretation of d in the QKD literature, which
we will treat in Sections IV.A and IV.B. This incorrect
failure probability interpretation of the QKD security
criterion d is prevalent, and the “distinguishability advan-
tage” derivation in Section IV.B remains widely quoted
and discussed as validation of the interpretation. The
issue is of major importance because the criterion issue
and its ramifications lie at the foundation of information
theoretically secure key generation, both classically and
in the quantum case. Thus, the full treatment of this issue
in this section is very much warranted.
We proceed by first explaining how a security crite-
rion functions in a physical cryptosystem where signal
transmission can be intercepted. As described in Section
III.A, based on her attack and the physical system
representation, Eve could derive a conditional probability
distribution p(k|y) on the various possible values of K
given her observation Y . She also has side information
from the execution of the protocol, namely, the public
announcements in the QKD case, which we can label
as z. We use the following notational abbreviations by
suppressing the y and z dependences
p(k|y, z)→ p(k|y)→ p(k) = {pi} (11)
Specifically, the distribution p(k) applies to a given z
and y. The pi are ordered as in (4) so that a k value that
leads to the value p1(K) is a most likely estimate of K
from Eve’s given z and y.
Note that it is this whole probability profile p(k|y, z)
that represents the general results of Eve’s attack, which
are not simply an estimate of K, and as we will see,
the results cannot be replaced by a single numerical
criterion. In a classical situation, p(k|y, z) is obtained
from the “channel” transition probability p(y|x′) and the
side information z. In the quantum case, there would be
infinitely many such transition probabilities, depending
on what quantum probe and what quantum measurement
Eve chooses to make. A security proof has to address all
such possible p(k) under a specific class of attacks or
all possible attacks allowed by the law of physics, as in
condition (i) of unconditional security.
It has been explicitly shown in Section III that an
information-theoretic single-number security criterion
merely puts a constraint on what possible p(k) Eve may
obtain, and it must satisfy the criterion constraint. For
mutual information, the constraint states that p(k|y, z)
must not give a higher IE value that is ruled out by
the security proof. Under the IE criterion, p1(K) given
by Eqs. (9) and (10) shows that IE → 0 exponentially
in |K| does not imply that K provides good security
asymptotically. Here, we ignore the random variations
in all parameters except k by focusing on p(k). Security
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will be weakened when these random variations are
considered in Sections V and VIII.
Classically, it is already more convenient theoretically
to measure the imperfection of K by its statistical
distance (variational distance [14], Kolmogorov distance)
δ(K,U) from the uniform distribution U than by IE as
follows. For two probability distributions P and Q on
the same sample space, the δ(P,Q) is defined to be
δ(P,Q) ≡ 1
2
∑
i
|Pi −Qi| (12)
Thus, 0 ≤ δ(P,Q) ≤ 1. From the well-known inequality
in [14, Eq. (11.137)], it immediately follows that, for
any subsequence or “segment” K∗ of K and denoting
δ(K,U) by δE similar to IE ,
p1(K
∗) ≤ 2−|K∗| + δE (13)
The result in [14, Eq. (11.137)] applies to any probability
value p(k∗) and hence to the maximum p1(k∗) in
particular. Under the constraint δE ≤ , it is easy to
show by explicit construction [5] that the bound (13) can
be achieved by many permissible p(k). (We will often
omit the unnecessary d ≤  or δE ≤  in the following
and simply set a d or δE level.) In particular, for any
K∗, one can achieve the bound (13) with equality. The
case of the entire key K∗ = K for the total compromise
probability
p1(K) ≤ 1/N + δE (14)
is of special importance. These classical results directly
apply to the quantum case in which a quantum trace
distance d(K) is defined between Eve’s probe and an
ideal quantum state to the users. After Eve measures
on her probe, a trace distance bound on Eve’s attack
simply translates to a bound on δ(K,U). Such a bound
constrains the p(k) that Eve could obtain from any probe
and quantum measurement. Thus, in this paper, one can
regard δE(K) as d(K) in the context of a quantum
protocol.
Note that (14) shows the exponential problem in
numerical security guarantee through δE similar to (10)
above. An exponentially small δE = 2−l only gives
security on p1(K) corresponding to an l-bit uniform key
after dropping the small 1/N factor in (14). In particular,
achieving (14) with equality already shows that the fail-
ure probability interpretation of δE is logically incorrect
because it does not include the 1/N factor.
A. Failure Probability and Failure Probability Per Bit
The original interpretation of the quantum trace dis-
tance d(K), which may be abbreviated as d, is based on
a “failure probability” interpretation on the classical δE ,
which d would reduce to upon Eve’s measurement on
her probe. A key K is called “-secure” when d ≤ .
It is stated in [30, p.414] that “an -secure key can be
considered identical to an ideal (perfect) key- except
with probability ” (emphasis in original statement).
In addition, in [29, p.414], it is stated that “the real
and the ideal setting can be considered identical with
probability at least 1 −  ”. Therefore, the “failure” in
the “failure probability” refers to K being not perfect,
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and a failure probability Pf ≤  guarantee means that it
is rigorously proved that there is a maximum probability
 that K fails to be perfect. This unambiguous and
incorrect interpretation is repeated in many papers; see
note [25] of ref [8] for a collection of cases. This is
also explicitly asserted in the review [2] and in the most
complete QKD security proof available to date [36].
This error has never been acknowledged, and the
failure probability interpretation is widely perceived to
be correct. The valid consequence, Eq. (14), of a d
guarantee is stated explicitly in [35]; however, the incor-
rect interpretation is maintained as a vague paraphrasing
without noting the difference, and an indistinguisha-
bility argument is offered for such an interpretation.
The security consequences of an incorrect interpretation
will be presented in Sections V to VIII. Removing
such a misinterpretation is important to obtaining true
and proven security. In Section IV.A, we will analyze
the errors committed in drawing the failure probability
interpretation. In Section IV.B, we will do the same
for the “indistinguishability” argument, which is often
taken to imply the same incorrect interpretation. In
Sections IV-VIII, we will see in many places how the
wrong interpretation misrepresents the security situation,
attributing a security guarantee to d that it does not
provide.
The above failure probability claim was drawn from
Prop. 2.1.1 in [29], which is the same as Lemma 1 in
[30]. It is re-stated as Theorem A.6 in [35]. The claim
states that, for two random variables X and Y in the
same space with probability distributions PX and PY
that are marginals of a joint distribution PXY , one may
obtain
P (X = Y ) = 1− δ(PX , PY ) (15)
Generally, for arbitrary PXY , one obtains the following
“coupling inequality” [37, Sections I.2 and I.5],
P (X = Y ) ≤ 1− δ(PX , PY ) (16)
Thus, (15) amounts to the assertion that the bound (16)
can be achieved by some PXY . Applying (15) with X =
K and Y = U , the probability P (K = U) is taken to be
a probability that K is not U , and the failure probability
interpretation of δE was thus drawn.
This is an example of interpreting mathematical sym-
bols incorrectly when addressing real-world applications.
There are several other such examples of incorrectly con-
necting mathematics and the real world in QKD security
analysis, say, in connection with “indistinguishability”
and “universal composition”, as we will see later. The
symbol P (X = Y ) merely abbreviates the probability of
an event in which the outcome of X equals the outcome
of Y from an applicable joint distribution PXY , namely,
P (X = Y ) =
∑
i
P (Xi = Yi) (17)
This does not say anything about the whole X and
Y themselves, as the failure probability interpretation
claims. More importantly, there is no joint distribution
at play in this QKD situation other than the indepen-
dent product distribution PX · PY , much less one that
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achieves the bound (16). The incorrect failure probability
interpretation reads into (15) meaning which is not
warranted. That it is wrong can be observed directly
[5] from a p(k) that achieves the bound (14), which
has the additional factor 1/N exceeding what is given
by the failure probability interpretation. When δE > 0,
the two distributions are necessarily different because
δ(PX , PY ) = 0 if and only if PX = PY . In what sense
then can K = U hold with a probability when δE > 0?
Such a probabilistic interpretation for given PX and
PY may be represented mathematically by the existence
of a distribution P ′ such that, from the theorem of total
probability,
PX = (1− λ)PY + λP ′ (18)
for a probability λ, in this case, λ = δ(PX , PY ). Because
P ′ is a probability distribution, Eq. (18) is easily shown
[38] to hold if and only if, for X = K and Y = U ,
(1− λ)/N ≤ pi ≤ λ+ (1− λ)/N (19)
For large N , up to which i varies, Eq. (19) implies all
pi take essentially the same value of approximately λ,
and hence, P must be nearly uniform. This condition
(19) cannot be satisfied for λ = δ(K,U) [8]. For any
λ, Eq. (19) implies a uniformity on pi(K) that does not
follow from simply a guarantee on δE . Specific counter
examples can be easily constructed.
Thus, several errors are committed in the original
derivation of the incorrect failure probability interpre-
tation, any of which would invalidate the derivation. We
omit a detailed discussion on the first two points, which
are rather self evident.
(i) There is no reason to expect that maximizing PXY
is in effect so that Eq. (15) holds despite (16).
(ii) The mathematical representation of the failure prob-
ability interpretation of δE is not given via a joint
distribution PKU , which is irrelevant to such an
interpretation.
(iii) The correct representation of the failure probability
interpretation is given by Eq. (18), which cannot
hold for λ = δE and which is also not warranted
for any λ because of (19).
Note that d(K) from (14) gives the “total compromise
probability” p1(K) of the whole K associated with
d(K), which is not the probability Pf that K turns out
to be non-uniform, apart from the 1/N factor. This is
because Pf ≤  implies p1(K) ≤  but not the other
way around, as we have shown.
A quantum trace distance measure d/|K| obtained
by dividing d by |K| and called the failure probability
per bit is introduced in [35], which clearly gives a
substantially lower failure rate than does d itself. It is
a misleading terminology because it suggests that the
bits in K are statistically independent. With such an
interpretation, the total compromise probability p1(K)
becomes not (14) but the following Pf :
p1(K) ∼ d versus Pf = ( d|K| )
|K| (20)
Two errors are committed in Pf above obtained from
a given d(K). Instead of applying d(K) ∼ p1(K) to K
as a whole, it is arbitrarily reduced by 1/|K| to give a
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“per bit” level d(K)/|K| and is then applied to each bit
of K independently regardless of the length |K|. As a
result, the p1(K) level is greatly underestimated as the
Pf in (20). Generally, dividing a quantity such as IE and
δE by the size |K| does not produce a bit-independent
quantity, as a matter of course.
This incorrect interpretation of “failure probability per
bit” is used in [35, p.14]:
(F) “For example, if an implementation of a QKD
protocol produces a key at a rate of 1 Mbit/s with
a failure per bit of 10−24, then this protocol can
be run for the age of the universe and still have an
accumulated failure strictly less than 1.”
The failure probability per bit here is d/|K| with the Pf
of (20). The numerical security situation of (F) is given
in Section VIII.B.
The failure probability per bit interpretation misses
the crucial point that the significance of a given d(k)
level depends strongly on |K|. A level of 2−10 may
be good for |K| = 1 but is poor for |K| = 103.
On the other hand, the guaranteed level (13) gives the
same bound d(K) on the difference from a uniform
distribution value 2−|K
∗| independently of the length
|K∗|. Thus, a d(K) value that appears to be small may
actually be relatively large for a long K or subsequence
K∗. This confusion occurs in the same manner in the
following distinguishability advantage interpretation of
d.
B. Distinguishably Advantage
The indistinguishability argument was originally used
in [28] and previously to argue that the trace distance d
in the quantum case or the statistical distance δE in the
classical case is a good measure of how close K is to an
ideal situation for the users. It is precisely formulated as
a distinguishability advantage statement for the binary
decision problem of discriminating between the two
distributions for K and U . We will simply consider
the δE case because the quantum detection problem
reduces to a classical one once the (optimal) quantum
measurement is fixed.
For the distinguishability advantage interpretation to
serve as a functional security criterion, say, on KPA,
one must first write down what the interpretation asserts
quantitatively for a given problem. It appears, as this
section will describe in detail, that the incorrect fail-
ure probability interpretation of Section IV.A is being
asserted. Specifically, distinguishability is supposed to
provide a justification of the interpretation. In addition
to the counter examples of Sections IV.A and V.A to the
failure probability interpretation of d, we show in this
section how such a justification is conceptually invalid.
Consider the well-known classical binary decision
problem of deciding between two hypotheses H0 and
H1 from an observed random variable with conditional
distribution P0 and P1 for the two hypotheses. The
maximum probability of a correct decision Pc is given
by
Pc =
1
2
+
1
2
δ(p0P0, p1P1) (21)
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where p0 and p1 are the a priori probabilities of H0
and H1. In (21), the δ(., .) is defined exactly as in (12),
with p0P0(i) and p1P1(i) taking the place of Pi and Qi.
When p0 = p1 = 1/2, the second term on the right-hand
side of (21) becomes
1
2
δ(P0, P1) in terms of an usual
statistical distance. For this equal a priori probability
case, δE becomes the “distinguishability advantage” of
knowing p(k) compared to the no observation case with
the a posteriori probabilities of H0 and H1 equal to the
a priori probability 1/2. Thus, it is thought that if δE is
small, K is hardly “distinguishable” from U .
It is easily observed from (21) that Pc is biased
toward hypothesis H0 when p0 > p1 and similarly for
H1. When p0 goes to 1, Pc for H0 also goes to 1,
as it should intuitively. It is not known how (21) is
related to the distinguishability advantage Pc− p0 when
p0 > 1/2. Thus, as it can already been observed from
simply the problem formulation, the criterion δE can
only admit a distinguishability advantage interpretation
in cryptography, if at all, for p(ideal) = p(real) = 1/2,
with p(ideal) being the a priori probability p0 of the
hypothesis H0 that the situation is perfect for the users
and p(real) for the actual situation where Eve has
made an observation described by her p(k). It is our
contention that this requirement of p(ideal) = 1/2 is not
realistically meaningful, and furthermore, no quantitative
security conclusion on Eve’s success probabilities can
be drawn from such interpretation; in particular, the
bound (13) or (14) must be derived mathematically from
the mathematical expression of δE with no extraneous
interpretation. The following already presents that the
conclusion of the real situation being “indistinguishable”
from an ideal one or having “distinguishability advantage
δE” cannot be validly drawn. The conditional probability
whereby the situation is ideal for the p0 = 1/2 case from
binary discrimination is given by
P (ideal|H0 = ideal) = 1/2 + δE/2,
P (ideal|H1 = real) = 1/2− δE/2
(22)
Why would the ideal situation have such a high proba-
bility close to 1/2 for any δE  1? This is because the
a priori probability p(ideal) is taken to be 1/2 to begin
with even though it should be 0.
Indeed, if it makes sense to assign an a priori
probability to the real and ideal situations in a binary
discrimination problem, the a priori probability of the
real situation should be 1, and the ideal situation should
be 0. This is also the conclusion drawn from (18)-(19)
above. However, what if one simply ponders the decision
problem with p0 = p1 = 1/2? Then, the conclusion
of such a problem cannot be applied to any real-world
problem. This is because such a discrimination problem
has no empirical meaning because we all know we are in
the real situation where Eve’s presence is assured. If this
may not be the case, the problem should be formulated
as one with all possible unknown probabilities of Eve’s
absence or “false alarms” [39] and not one with a fixed
a priori probability.
Furthermore, Eve never cares to make such a dis-
crimination; her objective is to learn about K. This is
another case of reading into mathematics an unwarranted
assertion about the real world. We will elaborate this
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point further in the remainder of this section because
there is a similar use of δE in conventional cryptography
that we cannot go into in this paper and that lends
unwarranted security significance to “indistinguishabil-
ity”. (In particular, correlations between the future bits
are not accounted for in the single-bit “distinguisher”
prediction, similar to what we indicated above at the
end of Subsection IV.A.)
The problem of a “metaphysical” distinguishability
interpretation can be observed from the fact that there
are many hypothetical situations, say, one with any δE
level, in addition to the δE = 0 ideal case. Should we
conduct multiple-hypothesis decision making? Why not
a binary one with one situation less secure than the real
one? Why would such a decision allow one to conclude
all the features of the decided upon hypothesis, which
are simply given by fiat?
One major problem of using such an distinguishability
advantage argument is that it becomes in one’s mind an
indistinguishability statement when the distinguishability
advantage δE is small. Indeed, the real situation and
the ideal situation are then taken to be distinguishable
and hence different only with probability δE . Thus,
δE becomes the failure probability interpretation of
the previous section! Such an explicit interpretation of
quantitative indistinguishability as failure probability is
common; see for example [40, p.3]. Moreover, it appears
to be used by many as a valid derivation of the failure
probability interpretation of δE despite the errors in the
original derivation discussed in Section IV.A and the
abundance of counter-examples to such a claim, the
reasons for its invalidity notwithstanding. The following
may help further clarify what went wrong.
There is a common-sense meaning of two items being
“indistinguishable,” with the Leibniz metaphysical prin-
ciple concerning the “identity of indiscernibles” implic-
itly used. That such an indistinguishability conclusion
cannot be drawn from a binary decision problem can be
directly observed from the common problem of radar
detection as to whether there is an incoming flying
object. In a militaristic situation, the object of concern
could be an enemy airplane, say, with or without a
warhead. The yes-no target detection problem of whether
an enemy airplane is present cannot alone determine
whether a warhead is on board. In the absence of further
information, one cannot infer that the airplane has a
warhead because that is hypothesis H1 in the binary
decision problem formulation, which one simply applies
by hand. There are many possibilities on the details of
the incoming target; it is not valid to pick one and
exclude others and then use binary discrimination to
affirm the picked possibility. Similarly, the occurrence
of an ideal situation is an unwarranted conclusion that
one cannot make use of in other problems. One has to
mathematically derive a result for a problem from the
given mathematical statement δE ≤ .
Indistinguishability arguments in terms of δE are
supposed to be “universally composable” in that they
justify the use of K in any application to which it would
be applied [28], [29]. We would later run into such issues
in connection with known-plaintext attacks and error
correction. Here, we may simply emphasize that there is
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no such automatic universal composability from δE or
d, with or without a distinguishability advantage. Even
in the case whereby it is composable, the proof from d
may be far from trivial, as we will also observe. The
main point is that an intuitive interpretation may only
serve as a guide to the general situation. Valid logical
and mathematical deduction from premise to conclusion
is required to establish proof. This is especially clear
when a quantitative level is desired.
Summarizing, the “distinguishability advantage” jus-
tification of operational guarantees from δE or d is
incorrect in several ways:
(i) The indistinguishable probability is for a specific
binary decision problem, which does not imply that
the two situations are indistinguishable in other
physical senses.
(ii) In the real world, the a priori probability for the
ideal situation cannot be 1/2; instead, it should be
0.
(iii) The ideal situation cannot be inferred to be the
real situation from the binary decision because it
includes other features not included in the binary
hypothesis testing formulation.
The key question to ask concerning the “distinguisha-
bility advantage” argument is what is the quantitative
security assertion? It seems that the answer so far is the
failure probability interpretation, to which we have given
various counter-examples in Section IV.A and will give
another in Section V.
V. SOME CORRECT GUARANTEES AND OPEN
PROBLEMS WITH THE CRITERION d
A. Guarantee On Known-Plaintext Attack
The bound (13) provides a security guarantee on
the security of K and its subsequences K∗ when Eve
attacks K during its generation process before it is used.
As mentioned before, when K is used for privacy, it
is more important to protect against known-plaintext
attacks to maintain the secrecy of K2 when K1, namely,
the remainder of K, is known to Eve. How does such
security follow from the incorrect failure probability
interpretation of d?
It seems that this issue is addressed explicitly only
in [35, Section 5.1], with the conclusion that the se-
curity is the same as that originally obtained from
d. Indeed, the failure probability interpretation alone
without the indistinguishability and other considerations
in [35] would appear to give such a conclusion already.
Thus, regardless of the K1 known to Eve, K2 remains
uniform to her except for a probability d. Note that the
distinguishability interpretation gives exactly the same
quantitative security conclusion as the failure probability
interpretation, as noted in Section IV.B.
Such a conclusion is incorrect, as the following
counter-example shows. Let k0 be a specific sequence
of k with probability p(k0) = 2−m. We denote the first
m bits of k0 by k01 and the remaining n−m bits by k02 .
Let all the other sequences k with the first m bits k01
have p(k) = 0. The other sequences k with the first m
bits different from k01 are assigned a probability 2
−n as
in U . Then, δE = 2−m. When the known k1 in a KPA
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turns out to be k01 , Eve knows that the remainder k2 is
k02 with certainty, not with probability d.
The underlying reason that the failure probability
cannot be used to obtain correct results in KPA is that
there is no way to account for conditioning with just
such an interpretation, and “universal composition” is a
vague argument and not universal. Its validity needs to
be established for each composition situation. In KPA,
there is apparently no composition, and thus, the original
d result is inferred in [35] as noted above, which is
numerically very incorrect.
Apparently, KPA security on p1(K∗2 |K1) of (6) can
be obtained directly from (13) by writing its left-hand
side as an average, with K ′2 being the remainder of K2
apart from K∗2 :
∑
k1
p1(K
∗
2 |k1)p(k1) ≤ 2−|K
∗
2 | + δE (23)
for
p1(K
∗
2 |k1) =
∑
k′2
p1(K
∗
2 |k1, k′2)p(k′2|k1) (24)
It is observed from (23) that the probability guarantee for
KPA now is an average over K1. This is fully in accord
with the above counter-example. When we remove the
K1 average to obtain an individual guarantee, we need
to apply a Markov inequality for K1. The drawing of a
specific d from possible PACs and a specific y from an
observation Y also requires a Markov inequality. This
will be discussed in Section V.C. In Section V.D, we
will make clear that all these classical results are what
quantum results reduce to.
B. Bit Error Rate (BER) Guarantee
The following security question arises: how many bits
will Eve correctly obtain even though her estimate of K
or K∗2 is incorrect as a sequence under a d guarantee
through (13) or (23)? For example, Eve guessing a 4-bit
K to be 0010 when it is actually 0011 makes a sequence
estimate error but only a one-bit error out of four, not
the uniformly random result of two errors. However, an
error rate leak in security that differs from the uniformly
random level of 1/2 is equivalent to a non-uniform a
priori distribution p0(K), which is known to Eve. For
instance, Eve knowing that six out of ten bits of a K∗
are correct but not knowing which are the correct bits is
equivalent to having an a priori p0(K∗) with a biased
probability 0.6 on each single bit in the case that the bits
are independent. Hence, the issue must be addressed in
assessing ultimate security.
In ordinary communications, this is called the bit
error rate (BER) issue in coded systems, in contrast
to the sequence error rate addressed in most perfor-
mance analyses. This does not represent a serious issue
there because, typically, a sequence error rate itself
can already be driven to zero and because BER is in
any case an improvement over the sequence error rate.
The main information-theoretic problem to cryptogra-
phy users concerns Eve’s performance from the users’
viewpoint, which is opposite to the performance concern
of the users themselves. It turns out that the relative
importance of the different issues may be different in
cryptography in addition to the fact that the required
performance analysis is often more difficult, say, in
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lower bounding instead of upper bounding Eve’s error
probability.
The BER is 1/2 when K = U under any attack. From
the failure probability interpretation of d, one would
obtain, for any subset K∗ of K in the absence of known-
plaintext attacks, the following bound on such a bit error
rate.
BER ≥ (1− d)/2 (25)
Counter-examples to (25) can be readily constructed for
small n. The actual BER needs to be validly bounded
from a given δE . Eve’s BER, which is less than 1/2,
gives her information that is not available for a perfect
K = U , and its quantitative security consequence needs
to be obtained.
It is important to observe that the BER is a very
important security criterion in addition to those of (6);
however, it alone is not sufficient as a security guarantee.
All these different probability criteria arise naturally for
different security concerns for a given p(k), and all have
direct operational meaning. They are perfectly protected
against Eve when K = U .
An approximate bound for the whole K can be derived
[41] from standard information theory results through the
entropy H(K) of K. Let the bit error probability be
pb ≡ Pb(k) = 1
n
∑
i
Pe(i) (26)
where Pe(i) is the probability that the ith bit in K is
incorrectly obtained from her regardless of the estimate
of K. With H2(·) being the binary entropy function, we
have from the Fano inequality [8] that
nH2(pb) ≥ H(K)− IE (27)
The right-hand side of (27) can be bounded via δE for
δE ≤  by neglecting IE compared to H(K) and using
the theorem in [14, p.664],
H(K) >˜ n− 2(n+ log 12 ) (28)
A bound on pb follows from combining Eqs. (27)-(28);
see [41] for a discussion on the relatively weak bound
on such pb in comparison to sequence errors. Note that
the bound (13) for a single-bit K∗ does not concern the
BER, which is obtained from a sequence estimate of a
long K∗ with some bits being correct even though the
sequence is wrong.
For a general subsequence K∗, there is no known
result on the BER guarantee from δE or IE and none
for K∗2 under KPA with known k1. The bound (25)
from the failure probability interpretation on the BER
for KPA is contradicted by the same counter-example in
Section V.A. Summarizing, it is uncertain as to what
BER guarantee for Eve one can have under d ≤ .
Useful bounds on Eve’s BER for these cases are open
problems with basic security significance, as we will see
in connection with error correction in Section VI.
C. Necessity Of Individual Guarantee And Conse-
quences
In the industrial control of product manufacturing, the
criterion employed is usually the probability an item fails
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to meet a pre-set standard, not the average number of
failures. The former is a more stringent and operationally
meaningful criterion, as we will see. If we have a zero-
one random variable, then the probability of one variable
is the same as the average. Otherwise, from the average
E[Z] of a positive-valued random variable Z, we can
bound the probability that Z exceeds a given level γ > 0
by the Markov inequality [14]
Pr[Z ≥ γ] ≤ E[Z]/γ (29)
The Markov inequality is needed because, often, only
E[Z] may be evaluated or bounded and because P [Z ≥
γ] cannot be obtained via another route. This is the
situation in the QKD security proofs.
There are at least three reasons why probability guar-
antees should be used instead of average guarantees. First
of all, consider the (artificial) example of a cryptosystem
that has a 50/50 chance of being secure for 100 years or
totally insecure. Its average security duration is 50 years;
however, no one would find such security meaningful.
Second, the average has no direct operational meaning
when the trial sample size is small relative to the size
of the probability (sample) space for a single trial.
This is evident in the case of one sample trial, the
meaning of probability for which has been extensively
discussed; see, for example, [42]. There are insufficient
samples for the average effect to kick in with a small
variance in the sample mean (average), and we should
use probability to assess the trial sample property. This is
found to always be the case in QKD protocols. A third
reason is that an empirical average (sample mean) is
not a deterministic quantity. An empirical average lacks
operational significance without some guarantee that the
spread around the mean is sufficiently small.
In QKD protocols, there are many random parameters
with a probability distribution. The final trace distance
d obtained is itself an average over the possible PAC
codes, only one of which is used in a single round
(see Section VI.A). Such an average result is common
in information theory work with the so-called “random
coding” argument. The possible number of PAC codes is
substantially larger than 2|K| even if a Toeplitz matrix is
used as the PAC, as is commonly the case. Therefore, the
averaged d has to be first converted into an individual d
from (29). Then, a measurement of some Y is involved
in Eve’s attack, which is the suppressed y dependence
of Eve’s p(k) that we focused on previously. Either
classically or quantum mechanically, the guarantee is on
the average over Y , and it also needs to be converted into
a probability for a specific y. The number of possible ys
again far exceeds 2|K|. These two averages are both on d
and can be combined. There is another average over the
known K1 in KPA that we need to address in the case
of protection against known-plaintext attacks discussed
in Section V.A. Therefore, in total, we would need to
apply (29) one or two times.
The inequality (29) allows one to exchange the level of
the failure threshold γ with another “failure probability”
level Pr[Z ≥ γ] that exceeds the desired threshold level.
In QKD security proofs, the Z itself is a probability, as
observed in Sections IV and V, and is a random quantity
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depending on the values of several other random system
parameters. If we did not use these two probabilities,
we would not know quantitatively what individual prob-
ability guarantee we may obtain. We could address such
uses of (29) in the final security guarantee by adjusting
the exchange to minimize any “failure probability” of
the protocol as follows.
Consider the p1(K∗) of (13) when 2−|K
∗| is negligi-
ble compared to δE . Then, with p1(d ≥ δ) denoting the
conditional probability of p1(K∗) given d ≥ δ, etc., we
have, under E[d] =  and δ = 1/2,
p1(K
∗) = p1(d ≥ δ)P (d ≥ δ) + p1(d < δ)P (d < δ)
< 1 · 
δ
+ δ · 1 = 21/2
(30)
We have used (29) and minimization over δ to arrive at
the guarantee (30). Similarly, abbreviating p1(K∗2 |k1) by
p1 with 2−|K
∗
2 |  f for EK1 [p1] = f , we have
p1 = p1(d ≥ f)P (d ≥ f) + p1(d < f)P (d < f) (31)
p1(d < f) = p1(d < f, p1 ≥ g)P (p1 ≥ g)
+ p1(d < f, p1 < g)P (p1 < g)
(32)
Thus, from (29) and minimization over (f,g),
p1 < 1 · 
f
+ 1 · f
g
+ 1 · g = 
f
+
f
g
+ g
< 31/3 for f = 2/3 = g2
(33)
The bounds (30) and (33) are loose; however, it appears
that there is no way to tighten them without further
knowledge of the random system parameters.
Because the BER is a very nonlinear function of the
security criterion δE , it is not known how the average
δE can be converted into an individual guarantee, in
contrast to the p1(K∗) or p1(K∗2 |K1 = k) case above.
Of course, we do not even have a BER bound without
such an average, except for the whole K from (27)-(28).
The numerical security guarantee from (30) and (33)
is devastatingly worse than the original -level guarantee.
Indeed, even with the incorrect failure probability inter-
pretation of d discussed in Section IV.A, one application
of (29) is required to obtain an individual guarantee on
Eve’s probability of successfully estimating the whole
K even without any side information on K1 during its
use, as discussed above; see Section VIII for numerical
examples.
D. Validity of Classical Information-Theoretic Results in
QKD
At this point, it is appropriate to emphasize that the
classical analysis of δE and IE that we presented in
this paper applies directly to the quantum case. This is
because, regardless of the utilized quantum criterion, d
or otherwise, the criterion would reduce to a classical
quantity once Eve makes her quantum measurement
on her quantum probe. The trace distance d would
reduce to a classical statistical distance δE , and the
accessible information would reduce to classical mutual
information. However, different quantum quantities may
lead to the same classical quantity but are essentially
different quantum mechanically. This turns out to be the
case for quantum accessible information and the Holevo
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quantity; a guarantee from the former allows quantum
information locking leaks, which is not the case for the
latter [43]. The Holevo quantity guarantee is essentially
equivalent to the trace distance d guarantee. From this
quantum equivalence [28], [43], one immediately has the
following bounds, which establish the essential equiva-
lence of δE and IE in a classical protocol and which
provide a general security guarantee to classical protocol
security proofs via IE similar to that provided by δE
given in this paper:
2δE
2 ≤ IE ≤ 8nδE + 2H2(2δE) (34)
The δE in (31) is an average over the observation Y
in classical protocols, which is automatically included
in the quantum trace distance. This is exactly as in the
I(K;Y ) case.
VI. INFORMATION LEAK FROM ERROR CORRECTION
AND PRIVACY AMPLIFICATION
In this section, we consider the problem of quantifying
the security of the ECC output K ′ and the PAC output K,
the generated key in Fig. 2, as well as how ECC and PAC
affect the final key generation rate. The information leaks
from error correction and privacy amplification were not
considered in the earlier security proofs [7], [26], [27].
This is sometimes justified by the invalid reason that the
open exchange in these two steps is performed after Eve
sets her quantum probe. However, Eve may make her
quantum measurement and key estimate after the open
exchange. Apparently, the PAC step can be rigorously
quantified if the ECC step has also been quantified;
however, the ECC step cannot be quantified, and there
is no hint as to how a rigorous quantification of error
correction may be performed in a QKD protocol. Before
discussing the error correction problem, we first discuss
privacy amplification and its effect on the key rate.
A. Privacy Amplification
The basic idea of privacy amplification is to increase
the security level by compressing the input bit sequence
into a shorter output bit sequence. Intuitively, this is well
known to be possible when the input bits are statistically
independent to Eve. For example, given two bits x1 and
x2, each known to Eve with error probability p < 1/2,
the bit x1 ⊕ x2 is known to her with error probability
1 − 2p + 2p2, which is larger than p. When the input
bits are correlated, if simply from Eve’s possible attack,
the situation is far less simple. Useful results can be
obtained using linear hashing compression represented
by a |K ′| × |K| matrix via the so-called Leftover Hash
Lemma [44], which has a direct quantum generalization
[45]. The Leftover Hash Lemma for “universal hashing,”
which covers all PAC in use, provides the tradeoff
between the d-level d(K) of K and its length |K| by
the following formula, with p1(K ′) = 2−l(K
′),
|K| ≥ l(K ′)− 2 log 1
d(K)
≡ g(K,K ′) (35)
Because it is not known whether |K| greater than the
minimum g(K,K ′) on the right-hand side of (2) could
be obtained, the guaranteed key rate is given by the quan-
tity g(K,K ′). Note that 0 ≤ d ≤ 1 and |K| ≤ l(K ′).
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Furthermore, the minimum d(K) one can obtain is, from
0 < g(K,K ′),
d(K) ≥ p1(K ′)1/2 (36)
We can simply take the quantum d(K) in this paper
to be the largest statistical distance δ(K,U) that Eve
may obtain. This Leftover Hash Lemma guarantee is an
average over the family of possible hash functions from
which the PAC is drawn. The specific PAC used is openly
announced, and the performance is an average over
possible codes, which is common in “random coding”-
type arguments.
A specific δE(K) or d(K) level has to be first
guaranteed in the security analysis to remove the PAC
averaging. There are evidently some PACs with poor
security, say, whenever the PAC matrix is degenerate
(rank less than |K|), for which a degeneracy of m ≤ |K|
would leak m Shannon bits with certainty. If such
degeneracy is first tested, a daunting practical task given
that |K| is tens of thousands and given that |K ′| is a
multiple of |K|, the resulting family is not known to
obey the “universal family” condition required for the
proof of the Leftover Hash Lemma. A high-probability
guarantee on an adequate specific d-level is therefore
essential.
The following inequality evidently holds for the K’s
in Fig. 2:
p1(K
′′) ≤ p1(K ′) ≤ p1(K) (37)
The first inequality in (37) follows from Eve possibly
possessing more knowledge from the error correction
in estimating K ′. The second inequality follows from
privacy amplification being an open many-to-one trans-
formation. As will be discussed in Section VI.B, the
users could and indeed may have to cover the chosen
ECC via shared secret bits; therefore, one would obtain
K ′′ = K ′ assuming that correctness (Alice and Bob
agree on the same K) is obtained with a sufficiently
high probability. In such a case,
p1(K
′′) = p1(K ′) (38)
When the ECC is covered by an imperfect key, there
is no known bound on p1(K ′), as will be observed
in Section VI.B. Hence, there is also no guarantee on
the d-level of the final K from (35), and the PAC step
justification from (35) and (38) is lost because (38) is
no longer valid. The rigorous validity of the final d(K)
level is correspondingly lost from simply this problem.
Note that it is not possible to cover a PAC using
shared secret bits because this would require a bit cost
substantially greater than the number of key bits |K|
generated because |K ′| is typically many times |K|.
The open announcement of PAC is fully considered in
the Leftover Hash Lemma. There is no similar result
that would yield the PAC information leak automatically
from another known approach [46].
Privacy amplification exemplifies the exchange of key
rate and privacy level inherent in QKD protocols. For
PACs to which the Leftover Hash Lemma is applicable,
there is the limit (35) on how small d(K) can be made
whereby |K| remains positive. In general, from (35),
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p1(K
′′) sets a limit, via p1(U) = 2−n, on the number of
uniform key bits that can be generated, and p1(K ′′) is
constrained by (3) in a IE guarantee and by (14) in a δE
or d guarantee on K ′′. Such an exchange is fundamental.
It has not been shown how, and it appears impossible,
one obtains a key at a given rate of |K| per round with K
made arbitrarily close to perfect by increasing a security
parameter in either a finite or an asymptotic protocol. In
particular, it is not possible to obtain p1(K) arbitrarily
close to 2−|K| from repeated use of linear PAC, which
is a direct consequence of (35)-(36). It is not known
whether a PAC may exist that leads to a better exchange
than (35). On the other hand, substantially more secure
keys than those reported in the literature can be obtained
from (35) at the expense of a decreased key rate [9]. In
particular, a “near-perfect” key K with d(K) = 2−|K|
may be obtained, although that alone does not address
the unsolved security issues concerning the BER and
ECC.
B. Error Correction and a Main Unsolved Problem
The error correction step is called “reconciliation” in
the early QKD literature and is to be achieved by an
open exchange Cascade protocol [47]. There is no valid
quantitative result on Cascade [48] because complicated
nonlinearly random problems are involved. Furthermore,
the difficulty of bounding the resulting p1(K ′) means
that the subsequent PAC step cannot be quantified if
one uses Cascade. The same situation is obtained when
the error correction step is performed openly, as further
discussed later in this subsection.
Currently, ECC is universally employed for error
correction in QKD protocols. In particular, large LDPC
codes are used, the performance of which is difficult to
analyze [44]. The problem of ECC information leaking
to Eve was not mentioned in earlier security proofs [13],
[26], [27], in [35] or in the recent review [2]; however,
the added side information of an ECC on K ′′ would
help Eve in her estimate Kˆ ′ of K ′ if the ECC is openly
known. In particular, if the ECC is too powerful, it may
even correct all of Eve’s errors in K ′′. As discussed
in Section IV.A, for security quantification, one would
need to bound p1(K ′), which is an impossible task
even classically for any given long ECC. There is a
further quantum issue [9] similar to quantum information
locking concerning the accessible information criterion.
Thus, the only viable security approach is to cover the
ECC using shared secret bits between uses and subtract
its cost from |K| to obtain the final generated key rate
|Kg|. Indeed, the following formula is currently used:
leakEC = f · |K ′′| ·H2(QBER) (39)
with
|Kg| = |K| − leakEC (40)
The factor f is arbitrarily taken to be 1 ≤ f ≤ 2, the
case f = 1 being the asymptotic |K ′′| → ∞ limit.
The justification of (39) is given in [36] by citing the
whole book [14], which does not address such recon-
ciliation issues or even ECCs. We give the following
argument for the case f = 1, which appears to be what
is intended in the earlier paper [49].
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Consider a linear (m, k) ECC with k information
digits and m code digits [50] such that the number
of parity check digits is m − k. If one assumes that
the K ′′ from the X ′ transformation in Fig. 2 can be
represented by a binary symmetric channel [8] with
crossover probability given by the QBER, then for k
given by the channel capacity 1 − H2(QBER), there
exists a linear code that would correct the errors from the
|K ′′| received bits for large |K ′′| by Shannon’s Channel
Coding Theorem, which is applicable to random coding
over linear codes only. Hence, the number of parity-
check bits that are to be covered by a one-time pad,
with m of the (m, k) code being |K ′′|, is
|K ′′| − |K ′′| · [1−H2(QBER)] = |K ′′| ·H2(QBER)
(41)
Thus, (36) for f = 1 is obtained.
We would first remark that the accounting in (39)
regards the K ′′ sequence as a codeword of an ECC,
which is sometimes explicitly stated in QKD security
analysis. In such a situation, covering the parity check
bits is not sufficient to uphold (38) needed for the PAC
step. This is because the structural information on the
specific ECC used, which is open because it would take
an excessive number of shared secret bits to cover it,
would induce correlations among the bits in K ′ such
that it becomes impossible to estimate the increase in
p1(K
′′) to p1(K ′). Even the effective K ′′ itself has been
changed when it is taken as a code word. On the other
hand, by regarding K ′′ as the information digits of a
linear ECC in a systematic form, Alice may simply add
further parity check digits and cover them by a one-time
pad, hence preserving (38). If the covered parity-check
digits are assumed to be error free, then (39) continues
to hold. In reality, the digits have to be error protected
for the classical channel used for their transmission. If
that channel is taken to have the same error rate give by
QBER, a different leak′EC is obtained because the k of
the (m, k) code is now K ′′:
leak′EC = |K ′′| ·H2(QBER)/[1−H2(QBER)] (42)
which is larger than leakEC . The resulting |Kg| = |K|−
leak′EC will be correspondingly smaller.
The combined key rate reduction effect of the PAC and
only (39) is quite pronounced. In addition to the intrinsic
physical inefficiency of QKD, they further severely limit
the obtainable key rate in a full protocol.
There are several basic problems with such an ap-
proach to quantifying ECC security [9], [51]. The as-
sumption of a binary symmetric channel is not valid
under general attack by Eve; otherwise, there would
have been no problem in quantifying the K ′′ security
since QKD day one. The pulling back of the asymptotic
|K ′′| → ∞ limit to a finite |K ′′| with an ad hoc factor
1 ≤ f ≤ 2 is completely unjustified. Although the
parity-check covering bit cost in a concrete protocol
may be smaller than (40) when the protocol continues to
function correctly (from other issues, such as correctness,
that we do not discuss in this paper; however, see Section
VI.C), the hand waiving assignment of f = 1.1 or
1.2 in the literature shows that QKD security has not
been rigorously quantified in principle. This is because
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no correctness is guaranteed if an empirically measured
quantity is used for the bit cost in lieu of (39). Some
formal results on information leakage in open ECCs are
presented in [52]; however, (39) is employed in actual
evaluations [53].
Substantially more serious is the following basic se-
curity issue. The importance of QKD derives from the
fact that key bits can be continuously generated between
two users; in particular, such bits can be used to execute
a future QKD protocol. Otherwise, one does not obtain
effective key generation. We can perform the analysis
above for ECC security only by assuming that the shared
key bit used to cover the parity-check digits are the
perfect one-time pad bits. When K is not perfect, what
would the information leak be? This problem is never
explicitly addressed in the literature. In the following,
we will ascertain whether “universal composition” may
be of assistance.
Universal composition has been based on two different
arguments. The standard one [28], [29] is the metric
property of δ(P,Q) or of the quantum trace distance.
For application to the present ECC problem, we have
δ(Pideal, Pecc) ≤ δ(Pideal, Pno ecc) + δ(Pno ecc, Pecc) (43)
where Pideal, Pecc, and Pno ecc refer to Eve’s distribution
on K for the ideal case K = U , the case when a
specific ECC is used and the case when no ECC is
used. In the quantum situation, the classical δ(P,Q)
would be replaced by the trace distance between corre-
sponding density operators, i.e., the quantum counterpart
of classical distributions. From (43), we need to bound
δ(Pno ecc, Pecc) to obtain a δE level with ECCs, which
appears to be an impossible task, and no result has ever
been reported for carrying through this universal compo-
sition argument. There is no valid proof if δ(Pno ecc, Pecc)
is taken to be the δE level of the key Kecc used to cover
the ECC. In particular, the BER leaks of Kecc discussed
in Section V.B would alone give Eve significant side
information to improve her estimate of Kecc and hence
of K ′′. There is a complicated nonlinearity involved in
these δ levels.
The other argument [54] uses an incorrect and thus
invalid failure probability interpretation of δE or d. If
the argument were to be valid, then one would add the
d-level of the ECC covering key to the overall d-level.
As we have observed in Sections IV and V, some details
concerning K are not protected by d(K); however, they
are protected under the incorrect failure probability in-
terpretation. In particular, the interactions of the different
parts of a protocol indicates that one may not need
an entire portion to be correctly estimated to improve
an overall estimate on another portion. How a BER
leak of Kecc would affect Eve’s success probabilities
through the ECC appears to be a complicated function of
the given ECC. There is no reason why δ(Pno ecc, Pecc)
would equal δ(Kecc, U) in the absence of an explicit
proof. Moreover, such a level cannot be generally correct
because when the ECC is sufficiently powerful to correct
all errors, the m−k parity check digits would reveal all
k bits of K ′. However, the failure probability derivation
of universal composition [54] needs such further proof.
Using extraneous interpretation is not an alternative to a
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valid mathematical deduction.
The severity of the d-level limit on a QKD key in
applications will be described in the following sections
on message authentication. In the present ECC case, it
appears extremely difficult to derive reliable estimates.
One may thereby conclude that the security of the ECC
step in a QKD protocol has not been, and appears that
it cannot be, analyzed quantitatively in a valid manner.
As a consequence, the PAC step is not justified due to
the lack of a rigorous bound on p1(K ′), as discussed in
Section VII.A. Hence, the security of the entire QKD
protocol has not been reliably, and certainly not rigor-
ously, quantified. This defect is not one of complexity
in numerical evaluation but one of fundamental validity
of reasoning.
C. Fundamental and Practical Limits on Key Rate and
Security Level Exchange
In this section, we will summarize and explain the
important basic and practical limits on the exchange be-
tween |K| and d(K), including the possible adjustments
of what |K| is in a QKD round for such an exchange.
Indeed, what constitutes a QKD round?
Let us first ignore the practical limits on processing
long ECCs and PACs and simply attempt to determine
what is a good choice of |K ′′|. Because K ′′ has to
be error corrected, we need to introduce a measure
of correctness, namely, the probability that the users
agree on the same K ′. In a realistic protocol, there are
various system imperfections that would compromise
correctness; however, the necessity of error correction
alone implies that long ECCs need to be used. This arises
from the fact that K ′′ being broken into small pieces for
error correction is equivalent to using a shorter ECC in
sequence as a longer ECC, which has never been found
to be an efficient method of correcting errors. We simply
have to use a sufficiently long ECC, or equivalently a
sufficiently long K ′′, to achieve an adequate level of
correctness, i.e., of correcting all the errors in K ′′ with
a sufficiently high probability.
Let us simply consider a PAC from using the Leftover
Hash Lemma (35) because it is the only known way of
quantifying actual security levels. Even more generally,
from the nature of privacy amplification as bit sequence
compression, we can see that a long K ′′ prior to com-
pression is needed to obtain a good security level using
a sufficiently high compression bit ratio. In contrast
to ECC, one can break up K ′ into shorter pieces and
compress each piece. There is no correctness constraint;
the only fundamental limit is whether the p1(K) of the
smaller pieces is sufficiently small to ensure security
from (35), assuming that (38) holds. As discussed in
Sections VI.A-VI.B, this assumption does not hold when
the ECC is covered by an imperfect key, as in the QKD
case. Apart from this crucial issue, (35) provides the
fundamental exchange between the key rate and the
security level, other than the need to use the Markov
inequality multiple times, as discussed in Section V.A.
The key point of this connection is that it is not
possible to have a key that can be made arbitrarily close
to perfect by a security parameter, namely, condition (ii)
of unconditional security in Section II, from only the
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asymptotic vanishing of mutual information or statistical
distance, as explained in Sections III.A and IV.A. With
(35), the limit on the exchange is explicit. This limit
can be relaxed in one direction by sacrificing security
to obtain a better key rate with the -smooth entropy
formulation commented on in [43]. However, relaxing
security is not satisfactory given the current inadequate
values to be discussed in Section VIII. Furthermore,
relaxing security for longer keys is what conventional
cryptography is apt to do.
In practice, the use of long ECCs and PACs is limited
by the complexity of the processing involved. Both
ECC processing and large matrix multiplication have
been studied for decades, and it appears that it will be
impossible in practice to address ECCs on K ′′ broken
into pieces, whereby each of which is significantly longer
than 106, in the foreseeable future. In the absence of a
full protocol including message authentication, a QKD
round may thus be defined by the stages of the protocol
that check QBER and generate a sifted key K ′′ with
subsequent ECC and PAC applied, as in Fig. 2, the length
|K ′′| being limited by current technology.
A more important concept of a QKD block Kb may
be defined by the PAC through (35), with security level
d(Kb) determined from p1(K ′b) for input blocks of
length |K ′b| to the PAC. Thus, |K ′b| has a maximum
value of |K ′| for a round but may be considerably
shorter. Under the assumption of K ′ correctness, the
discussion on K ′ being broken down into many K ′b is
based on practical considerations. However, this impacts
on security because the blocks Kb within a round may
be correlated, and we also need to bound p1(K ′b) instead
of p1(K ′).
VII. LIMIT ON USE OF QKD-GENERATED KEYS IN
MESSAGE AUTHENTICATION
Message authentication, in which a data message is
checked to determine whether it has been altered, is often
considered as a cryptographic task more important than
privacy [3], [4]. A QKD protocol necessarily involves
message authentication on the open exchange between
the users for basis matching, QBER checking, and
concerning the choice of ECC and PAC after Eve sets
her probe. At the very least, message authentication is
required to thwart a man-in-the-middle attack Eve may
launch by pretending to be Alice to Bob and Bob to
Alice. The security of a message authentication code
(MAC), which is a hash function for bit compression,
is sometimes based purely on complexity. In QKD pro-
tocols, MAC has to have information-theoretic security;
otherwise, it would contradict the QKD claim of being
information theoretically secure. A review of information
theoretically secure message authentication can be found
in [55, ch. 4] and [56]. A brief summary for our purpose
is given as follows.
For a data message m of a given bit length, a data
tag of much shorter bit length t = h(m) is obtained by
applying a “hash function” h to m, say, by a compression
matrix, as in a PAC, which is chosen from a given family
of hash functions. In a substitution attack in the open
tag case, given h(m1) = t1 and m2, Eve finds t2 with
h(m2) = t2. If the h is chosen with a uniform secret
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key Kh, Eve’s success probability ps is bounded by 
when the family of the hash function is an -ASU family.
Concerning both substitution and impersonation attacks,
in the latter, Eve finds t for a given m such that t = h(m)
for the correct h with success probability pI :
ps ≤ , pI ≤  (44)
There is a general lower bound on the achievable  for
a given tap bit length |t| that may be achieved:
 ≥ 1/|t| (45)
When the key Kh is a QKD key with d(Kh) ≤ ′, it
can be shown that [57]
ps ≤ + ′ · |t| (46)
which may go to 1 and be achieved with equality for
some t. The average of ps over possible ts, ps, is
bounded by + ′, as is pI [57]:
ps ≤ + ′, pI ≤ + ′ (47)
It follows from (47) that ps and pI , not to say ps for
individual ts, cannot be decreased with longer |t| or
longer |Kh| so long as the level of d(Kh) = ′ is given.
In particular, the authentication security parameter |t|,
which allows security to be arbitrarily close to perfect
from (44), is lost due to the use of an imperfect Kh.
We do not yet know how to rigorously remove the
average d and average t guarantee in (47) via the Markov
inequality to obtain an individual guarantee because the
problem is nonlinear. If we apply (33) as a guess, numer-
ically, after averaging is removed via (24) for obtaining
an individual d(Kh) and an individual t guarantee, one
would need d ∼ 10−30 to achieve the same security as a
32-bit |t| from (45) and (47) or d ∼ 10−60 on a 64-bit |t|.
These d values are completely unrealistic, as observed
in Section VIII. Note, however, that that is simply the
p1(K) level and does not cover BER leaks that provide
information on Kh to Eve.
Similar results are available for multiple uses of a hash
function with tags covered by an imperfect key Kt with
d(Kt) = ′′, say, for m uses of h [58]:
ps ≤ +m′′ (48)
A large number of uses of h are needed in one QKD
round because many uses are needed for authenticating
a long sequence of bits. Thus, the security guarantee is
further lowered with (48). Its quantitative effect on the
final security of K is unknown because the universal
composition argument is not valid due to the problem
nonlinearity alone.
Equally significantly, the authentication steps in a
QKD protocol have not been specified within the context
of the other steps, with its imperfect levels considered.
As we have seen, one cannot obtain a valid derivation
of the final K security level by declaring universal
composition without explicitly detailing the justification
of the argument in context. The execution of a QKD
round requires a significant number of shared secret key
bits for message authentication and error correction. It
is yet unclear how quantitative security would emerge if
the key used for such purposes is imperfect, as it must
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be for most QKD rounds.
VIII. NUMERICAL INADEQUACY OF SECURITY
GUARANTEE
As emphasized in Section IV.A, the criterion d applies
to a key K generated in a single QKD round. It would
not be meaningful to cite a d level without stating the
length of K to which it applies, in effect making it a |K|-
dependent d(K). Eve’s maximum possible probability of
obtaining the entire n-bit K is, from (14),
p1(K) = 2
−n + d (49)
A. QKD Block versus QKD Segment
For security quantification, it is important to make the
following two distinctions. First, as discussed in Section
VI.D, the key length |K| in d(K) may refer to that
of a QKD round or to that of a QKD block. Second,
within a block, we can have many different mutually
disjoint segments K∗ of consecutive bits under attack by
Eve with bit gaps between them. Security is prescribed
by d(Kb) whether Kb = K or not. The maximum
probability of leaking m different K∗i , i = 1, ..,m,
within a block is given, from (13), by
p1(K
∗
1 , ...,K
∗
m) = 2
−∑
i
|K∗i |
+ d(Kb) (50)
With KPA conditioning, Eq. (50) is replaced by an
average over K1 on the left-hand side similar to (23)
with respect to (13).
Note the nature of Eq. (50) in contrast to the failure
probability per bit d(K)/|K| of [35],[36], with such
bit failure probability taken to be independent among
bits of a block Kb = K, as in (20). The latter vastly
underestimates the p1(K∗1 , ...,K
∗
m) of (50). In particular,
it is not the case that a single bit would be leaked with
probability d(Kb)/|Kb|, as the failure probability per bit
interpretation implies. Rather, a number of bits equal to
the block length |Kb| is leaked with probability d(Kb)
(apart from the 2−|Kb| factor).
Generally, it is misleading to evaluate key rate or
security level on a per-bit basis. The actual data rate per
unit time should be employed for practical assessment,
as is the compromise probability per unit time. To bound
Eve’s success probabilities, one may not assume that the
blocks Kb within a round are independent; however, one
may make such an assumption for the K ′s from different
rounds. Certainly, the segments K∗i within a round are
not independent, as shown by (50). Even when assuming
that the blocks Kb are independent, the segment’s total
compromise probability (50) is far larger than that given
by the failure probability per bit interpretation. The
division of d(Kb) by |Kb| is fortuitous and misleading.
The numerical solution is illustrated in the next sub-
section.
B. Numerical Values
We consider here the use of many keys K generated in
different protocol rounds of a QKD system to guarantee
that the worst-case parameter p1(K) from p(K) from
each round is used, considering that there is no average
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on p1(K) itself, because there is no distribution for
the complete p(k). (See also objection B in Appendix
III.) When there is a distribution on a random system
parameter, we do not employ an average as a security
measure for reasons discussed in Section V.C. (See also
objection C in Appendix III.) In particular, according
to the operational guarantee statement (OG) of Section
III.A, a finite sample average in an experiment is a
random quantity on which probability statements can be
made instead of approximating it using the nonrandom
average.
Although the maximum p1 of p(k) is an unknown
nonrandom parameter without a distribution rather than a
random parameter [39], it is the probability of an event,
and we can talk about averages or expectation values
[41]. We cannot estimate its spread as in the random
parameter case and will simply consider the probability
as a fractional average. This is in contrast to the situation
wherein a distribution exists and a Markov inequality
(29) can be used to produce an operational probability
statement from the average (mean). In the present case,
the collection of p1 in different rounds can be given
instead. The following average values cited are to be
understood as having the same import as a probability
strictly speaking. Here, we cannot disentangle the pos-
sible conceptual subtleties of probabilities in real-world
applications. (However, see [41].)
The theoretical numerical values of [29] for single-
photon BB84 provide a tradeoff between key rate and
security. d(Kb) ∼ 10−9 is obtained for |Kb| ∼ 105.
If the key rate is 107 bps, a segment leak of a block
or a total of 105 bits within a block may be leaked on
average every 100 days if the d level is individual. The
leak becomes 300 blocks per day after one use of the
Markov inequality from (30). Against a KPA, the average
leakage becomes one block every 10 seconds from (33).
The experimental results in [59] give a key rate of
1.4 × 105 bps and d(Kb) ∼ 4 × 10−9 for |Kb| ∼ 105,
which are approximately equal to the values given in
[36]. This amounts to an average maximum of 6 blocks
or 6 × 105 bits per day leaked against ciphertext-only
attacks. Against a KPA, the rate is 100 blocks or 107
bits per day.
Note that, as shown in (50), these leak levels could
apply to many different segment leak combinations dis-
tributed across a single block. If the segments spread
across more than one block, one should compute the
leak probability of those within a block from d(Kb)
and then multiply them from independence to obtain the
total joint leak probability. Only observing the block-leak
probability, it appears that the above numerical guarantee
is far from adequate for almost all applications and is
certainly not adequate for commercial banking.
It is often argued that 10−15 is the “practical” proba-
bility level for guaranteeing impossibility. With realistic
numerical values of 107 blocks per day with |Kb| = 105,
a d-level guarantee of a practically perfect key (but
only from the viewpoint of p1(Kb), i.e., not “failure
probability”) in one day of operation would require a
d-level of 10−44 for ciphertext-only attacks alone. Such
a level is 35 orders of magnitude above the available
values of d from theory alone. There is no indication of
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how the numerical gap can be closed in any significant
manner, again only in theory and even assuming that
the security analysis in the literature is completely valid,
which is not the case. On the other hand, security can be
increased to a near-uniform level by further sacrificing
key rate, as presented in [9], although that would require
a larger |K| than the literature value, which is limited
by ECCs and other processing complexities; see Section
VI.C.
According to the failure probability per bit interpre-
tation discussed in Section IV.A under statement (F),
a failure probability per bit d/|K| of 10−24 for all
generated bits means that the QKD protocol “can be run
for the age of the universe and still have an accumulated
failure strictly less than 1”. This conclusion is obtained
from the incorrect Pf of (20). The block value |Kb| is
not specified. We take |Kb| = |K| = 106 for 1 second
of operation, which is a sensible value. These numbers
imply a possible average leak of 104 bits per day for
ciphertext-only attacks and 100 bps for KPAs. This
strongly contradicts the quote (F) that the accumulated
“failure” is strictly less than 1 over the age of the
universe.
Table 1 compares the numerical guarantees for a
|Kb| = |K| = 105-bit block at d = 10−9 and the
current theoretical [36] as well as experimental [59]
values at Mbps key rates. There are five cases that can
be compared: the incorrect failure probability per bit
interpretation [35], the correct average guarantee from
Eqs. (13) and (50), the individual operational guarantee
Eqs. (30) and (33), the case where K is uniform, and the
symmetric cipher results (see App. II) from expanding
a 128-bit seed key to 105 bits. For this nearly 1, 000-
fold symmetric key expansion, the seed key cost of
∼ 128 bits per 105 bits is needed in QKD for message
authentication within the QKD key generation round of
K. These results show that, even simply as an average
guarantee, there are only 30 bits of security in the
QKD system for the 105 bits compared to the 128 bits
of security for conventional ciphers under ciphertext-
only attacks. Further discussion is given in Appendix II.
The relevance of known-plaintext attacks is discussed in
Appendices II.B and II.C.
IX. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION
In this paper, we do not address the problems of
the very low efficiency of QKD, some of which are
discussed in [60] and many of which are intrinsic due to
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the small signal level and resulting sensitivity to distur-
bance. More significantly, we do not address the physics-
based security issues that have not been addressed in the
QKD literature but which are fundamental to a valid
security claim [61]. In addition, especially important
are the detector hacking attacks [62] that break most
current QKD implementations, including the checking
of the Bell inequality in establishing EPR pairs [63].
This demonstrates that cryptosystem representation is a
tricky and difficult issue in physics-based cryptography,
especially in QKD, where many physical details may
affect a single photon or a small signal that would not
matter for stronger signals. It is not yet clear what would
be a reliable justification to ensure that a particular
QKD system representation has incorporated all the
essential features of simply the cryptosystem operation
in a mathematical model that would address hacking, in
addition to other extraneous loopholes. This is a point
first emphasized in [64] and is found to be prescient in
several ways.
In this paper, we have analyzed the fundamental
information-theoretic security guarantees in cryptosys-
tems and shown in what ways current QKD security
analysis falls short. A brief history of some security
works in the literature is given in Appendix I, which
also contains a summary of the contents of the different
sections in the body of the paper. In Appendix II, a brief
comparison of QKD with conventional cryptography is
given to put the significance of QKD into perspective.
In Appendix III, some possible points of objection or
confusion are addressed.
A most important point of our foundational analysis
is that security must involve Eve’s success probabilities
in various problems. The incorrect failure probability in-
terpretation dissected in Section IV implicitly recognizes
such importance, and it has the following faulty security
consequences:
(i) Known-plaintext attack security is incorrectly quan-
tified, as shown in Section V.A.
(ii) The important criterion concerning Eve’s bit error
rate is incorrectly bounded, as described in Section
V.B.
(iii) Universal composition is obtained when it is not
valid, as in known-plaintext attacks, or when it re-
quires a further justification that appears impossible
to provide due to nonlinearity, as in error correction
treated in Section VI.B.
(iv) The security situation in message authentication
is misrepresented as an individual guarantee, as
discussed in Section VII.
(v) The failure probability per bit interpretation is se-
riously incorrect, as discussed in Section IV.A with
numerical security levels illustrated in Section III.B.
Generally, the failure probability interpretation ascribes
substantially improved quantitative security to what can
be validly deduced both qualitatively for problems in
which the trace distance criterion is yet to provide a
guarantee and quantitatively to problems the interpreta-
tion does give a guarantee to by neglecting the difference
between average and individual guarantees.
It appears that current QKD security is fundamentally
no different than the uncertain security of conventional
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mathematics-based cryptography. One may offer plau-
sibility arguments for security and quantify security
under some restrictive assumptions; however, there is
no proof against all possible attacks. It may be useful
to conduct research to develop new features for a QKD
system that would permit a general security proof that
is both transparent and valid. It would also be useful
to utilize quantum effects on larger signals to obtain
information-theoretic security. Some such attempts have
been undertaken in [5] and [65] in the KCQ and DBM
approaches. It remains to be observed the extent to which
QKD can be so broadened usefully.
APPENDIX I
HISTORY OF QKD SECURITY PROOFS
I would like to begin this appendix with the following
quotations:
“The variety in this field is what makes cryptography
such a fascinating area to work on. It is really a mixture
of widely different fields. There is always something new
to learn, and new ideas come from all directions. It is
impossible to understand it all. There is nobody in the
world who knows everything about cryptography. There
isn’t even anybody who knows most of it. We certainly
don’t know everything there is to know about the subject
of this book. So here is your first lesson in cryptography:
keep a critical mind. Don’t blindly trust anything, even
if it is in print. You’ll soon see that this critical mind
is an essential ingredient of what we call “professional
paranoia.” [4, p. 3]
“it is very easy for people to take criticism of their work
as a personal attack, with all the resulting problems.” [4,
p. 10]
These words were written on conventional cryptogra-
phy. They are even more appropriate for QKD.
In this appendix, we briefly outline the history of se-
curity proofs on BB84-type QKD protocols. There are a
very large number of papers on security proofs in QKD,
many of which are referenced in [2]. We will touch upon
mainly those that have been mentioned in the body of
the paper, including the more influential proofs on the
security quantification of concrete QKD systems. We
will also take the opportunity to mention some relations
between security analysis and QKD experiments thus far
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and to discuss some major physics security issues not
addressed in the body of the paper. Security proofs for
BB84 are the most well developed in the field. Other
security proofs share almost all the difficulties BB84
proofs face and more. We will summarize at the end a
list of problems that no proof in QKD has yet overcome,
with the exception of the KCQ-DBM approach; however,
the details of why and how that is possible are yet to
appear.
It may be noted that security proofs, in QKD or any
cryptosystem concerning privacy and key distribution,
are a very complicated matter. Errors and incompleteness
are to be expected during the early stages of their
development. These theoretical defects cannot be glossed
over in cryptography, although such defects are often
justifiably neglected in physics and engineering when a
final working experimental system is what decides suc-
cess or failure. Security cannot be proved experimentally,
if only because there are an infinite variety of possible
attacks, which cannot all be described. There were many
surprises in the history of cryptography; thus, whether
there is a valid proof in an important issue, especially
in QKD, where provable security appears to be the only
real advantage compared to conventional cryptography.
As in the case of many mathematical propositions, it is
not always possible to produce counter-examples to the
main conclusion. Sometimes, the statement is actually
true, such as the Poincare Conjecture and Fermat’s
Last Theorem, yet a valid proof is a separate matter
from assuming the truth. In the body of this paper, we
could only produce counter-examples to specific spots
of reasoning in a purported proof. We did not give a
specific attack that would always succeed. The burden
is on those who claim that there is a proof to produce a
valid one. One can always change the proof claim to a
plausibility claim, and we need to draw sharp boundaries
in cryptography. The discussions of this appendix should
be read with this in mind.
A. Earlier Proofs
The earliest general BB84 security proofs in [13]
and [26] are mainly on the security of the sifted key,
namely, K ′′ in Fig. 2. Earlier versions of [13] appeared
a few years before it did, and [66] provided an important
direction for [26]. There are several noteworthy problems
in these proofs, some of which are misinterpretations
from others and not by the authors; however, such errors
have perpetuated.
First, these proofs are asymptotic existence proofs
asserting the existence of a protocol that would yield
a purportedly perfect key in the limit of long bit length
|K ′′|. They use the mutual information criterion, which
we have shown in Section III.B cannot lead to such a
conclusion by its mere vanishing asymptotically. This
conclusion could not be drawn with the trace distance d
going to 0 either (Section IV). However, the prevailing
impression is that it could, and the issue is not addressed
in the recent review [2].
Second, there is no treatment of known-plaintext at-
tacks when the generated key is used for encryption.
Apparently, the quantum accessible mutual information
criterion is not sufficient for proving security against
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KPAs, as discussed in Section IV. A weakened protection
against KPAs is provided by d, as presented in Section
V.B.
Third, Eve’s side information from error correction
and privacy amplification are not considered and were
later addressed in different approaches, as discussed in
Section VI. The ECC problem remains to be rigorously
treated for any type of QKD protocol, of which we call
QKD or otherwise.
Fourth, these proofs are on qubits (two-dimensional
quantum state spaces) and lossless systems. In all im-
plementations, we have infinite-dimensional photon state
spaces with loss. For example, coherent detection by Eve
is ruled out by the qubit model. Loss is ubiquitous in
optical systems. No reason has been offered as to why it
would only affect throughput but not security in BB84,
although it is known that it does affect security in B92
[1]. See [61] for further discussions of these and other
physics-related security issues.
Fifth, although [26] is an existence proof among the
class of what is called CSS ECCs with associated privacy
amplification, it has been widely taken to have proved
the (asymptotic) security of any specific ECC and any
PAC. This error is found later in both experimental and
theoretical studies.
There are various spots of uncertain validity in the
reasoning of these papers. Although they are relevant to
security, for the sake of this paper, we can assume that
they are valid. The main concern in this regard is that the
issues involved are not purely mathematical but concern
the relation of a mathematical statement to its real-world
implication. We have observed some such examples in
Section IV for cryptographic relations. It is a special
problem for QKD in which quantum physics at the small
scale is tied to various classical physical or engineering
phenomena.
An important sequel to [26] is the widely quoted
[27], which extends [26] to include various system
imperfections by adjusting the final result in [20] using
the attainable key rate with purported asymptotic perfect
key generation. The derivations of these adjustments are
brief and heuristic and are based on ad hoc estimates.
There is no general formulation of the problem including
an imperfect feature that would demonstrate how the
original proof would address all possible attacks with
such imperfection. The PAC in [26] is a nonlinear hash
function; however, is treated as if it is linear. This [27]
is used as the basis of the security claim on the use of
decoy states for laser instead of single-photon sources;
some problems with such a connection are discussed in
[61]. In particular, it is not realized that a weak laser
pulse is itself coherent and not a mere multi-photon qubit
[61]. Ref [27] is also used in the security claim of the so-
called measurement-device-independent approach [25].
B. Later Finite Protocol Proofs
Security proofs for a finite and more specific protocol
were developed and culminated in [36] for lossless BB84
with various imperfections. Many approaches to bound-
ing Eve’s information on the sifted key K ′′ have been
attempted, therein settling on the “smoothed” minimum
entropy, which is used in numerical evaluations in [36].
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Such smooth entropy is equivalently Eve’s maximum
probability of obtaining K ′′ but with greater flexibility
in terms of giving up some level of security for a higher
key rate. (The use of these smooth entropies cannot
increase security by lowering the key rate.) The trace
distance criterion d is used because the small KPA
leak in the example of [31] was already considered
unacceptable, and the incorrect failure probability claim
from a d guarantee was maintained. We have discussed
in Sections V.D that d and accessible information are
indeed very different guarantees in the quantum domain
but are essentially equivalent classically from (34).
The errors in misinterpreting d are analyzed in Sec-
tions IV-V. Quantitatively, the numerical values of d
that were obtained are far from adequate simply on
the probability of compromising the entire generated
key K in a block, as discussed in Section VIII. The
actual security guarantee from d is detailed in Section
V. It is not given by the incorrect failure probability
interpretation, and it is not known whether it can cover
BER leaks, which for example Eve could use to attack
the QKD-key-covered parity check digits of a linear ECC
discussed in Section VI.B. The PAC information leak is
fully considered in [36], although the ECC leak is not,
as discussed in Section VI. There is the serious problem
of using an imperfect key for the purpose of covering
the ECC parity check digits mentioned above and for
message authentication in future rounds, the latter being
discussed in Section VII.
The approach of [26] is generalized in [45], [51],
[52] for a finite protocol. It is difficult to assess the
formal results in these papers. In [52], the same ad hoc
formula for ECC information leaks is used in an actual
evaluation, as in [36]. In a concrete protocol, there is are
advantages, only disadvantages, to these CSS-code-based
approaches in addressing the ECC and PAC information
leak problems as compared to the approach of [36].
C. Relations to Experiments
We will simply provide some general remarks to
indicate certain problems in the QKD experimental liter-
ature and will not dwell on specific analysis of the errors
in specific papers. That is a separate subject matter, i.e.,
not that of basic security analysis. Given the complexity
of QKD security analysis, it is a highly nontrivial task
to integrate all the components of a protocol for an
experimental system.
To begin with, no complete QKD protocol that in-
cludes message authentication and error correction with
an imperfect QKD key has been analyzed. In particular,
the message authentication steps are not interlaced with
exactly how the bulk of the protocol runs or with
what is being authenticated at what time, and the ECC
information leak is only considered by an ad hoc formula
without considering the relatively large d level of the key
used to cover its parity check digits. QKD experiments
do not usually concern the entire cryptosystem, the
necessary message authentication, or error correction and
privacy amplification. Often, a key rate is cited with
no security level attached, which is nonsensical for a
concrete protocol, as we observed in Sections II-III. Part
of the cause is apparently the use of [26], as discussed
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in the first point of Appendix I.A, with the belief that
security can be made arbitrarily close to perfect for a
given key rate below the threshold formula of [26] or
[27].
Such key rate results from [26], [27], with or without
system imperfections and assuming that they are com-
pletely valid, have yet to consider ECC and PAC leaks.
More significantly, they are often quoted for a system
that employs error correction and privacy amplification
methods, which is not a CSS code. Thus, those formulas
so quoted are not relevant because they have never been
shown in any way to hold outside of CSS codes, and
even then, such proofs are merely existence proofs and
do not pin down the working codes.
The situation is evidently better for the approach of
[30], the problems of which we have analyzed in the
bulk of this paper and briefly mentioned in Appendix
I.B. Even if we assume that everything is valid, the
obtainable security level is insufficient, i.e., d is too
large for many applications, as discussed in Section VIII.
Although a d level guarantee is not complete, it appears
to be a useful criterion and needs to be ascertained
for any concrete protocol analyzed without giving Eve’s
full success probability profile (4). However, DBM [65]
promises a new direct security approach yet to be made
public.
D. List of Major Unsolved Problems
There are three major security analysis problems that
have not yet been solved for any QKD protocol, with
exceptions noted below.
(1) In the presence of inevitable losses, it has not been
proved that only throughput is affected but not
security.
(2) When using an imperfect key in executing a QKD
protocol, it is not known what the error correction
information leak would be.
(3) No analysis has ever been given on a full protocol
involving message authentication with an imperfect
key, therein demonstrating the effects of key imper-
fection on the security level of the final generated
key.
Note that point (1) does not apply to CV-QKD (con-
tinuous variable), which is also immune to detector
blinding attacks [62]. (We do not discuss such very
serious hacking problems in this paper.) However, CV-
QKD suffers from other major problems [61] not found
in BB84.
The recent approach [67], which allegedly dispenses
with the information-disturbance tradeoff without con-
sidering even intercept-resend attacks, is subject to all
three points. The coherent-state KCQ approach in [5] is
not subject to points (1)-(2) and may not require error
correction due to its substantially larger signal level.
With error correction, the new DBM technique [56] may
be required.
APPENDIX II
COMPARISON OF QKD AND CONVENTIONAL
CIPHER SECURITY
By “conventional ciphers”, we mean mathematics-
based ciphers, which cover essentially all practical ci-
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phers in commercial use [3], [4]. These are different
from “classical ciphers”, which rely on simply classical
physics and include physical-noise-based cryptography
such as that described in [18], [19] and [20]. Quantum-
physics-based cryptography is yet another gene; how-
ever, by QKD, we mean the smaller subset defined in
Section I with BB84 as representative. QKD covers
key generation and direct encryption with the generated
key. We will compare both to some typical conventional
ciphers in current use. Such a comparison is important
for assessing the potential, progress, and future of QKD.
A. Asymmetric Key Ciphers
QKD has often been contrasted with asymmet-
ric or public key cryptography, which only includes
complexity-based security and no information-theoretic
security other than that in the sense of (7) in Section
III.A. However, it is substantially more appropriate to
compare QKD with symmetric key ciphers [8] because
a pre-shared secret key is needed to execute a QKD pro-
tocol other than for the purpose of agent identification.
Message authentication is needed to prevent man-in-the-
middle attacks. For this purpose alone, one would need
information theoretically secure message authentication
to preserve the overall information-theoretic security of
the QKD protocol, which requires a shared secret key.
As shown in Section VI, the error correction step of a
QKD protocol also requires a pre-shared secret key. Of
course, the QKD-generated key represents a pre-shared
key for future protocols. We have shown in Section VI
how the imperfect security level of such a key prevents a
valid security proof and its quantitative level from being
obtained.
In this subsection, we will simply make some com-
ments on the contrast between public key cryptography
and QKD. Asymmetric key protocols can be used for
both key generation and direct encryption for privacy.
They are not used for the latter in practice due to their
relative inefficiency compared to symmetric key ciphers.
QKD in practice is more inefficient and more complex
to operate compared to asymmetric key ciphers due to a
number of fundamental reasons such as low signal levels
and inevitable large losses. They have the advantage of
being provably information theoretically secure, which
is however not yet realized, as we show in this paper.
The advantage is often claimed that QKD encryption
is resistant to future compromise of the secret key in
conventional ciphers. That is surely the case in com-
parison to asymmetric key ciphers because decryption
of the public ciphertext may be obtained in the future
based on mere computational power. However, QKD has
no real advantage in this regard compared to symmetric
key ciphers because the shared secret key can simply be
deleted permanently. Furthermore, when the generated
key from QKD is used on a conventional cipher, such a
key shares the same problem, if any, as in the case of
symmetric key ciphers.
B. Symmetric Key Ciphers
Symmetric key ciphers can be used for “key expan-
sion”, effectively generating new “session keys” from a
master key, or for privacy encryption. When used for
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key expansion, they are very similar to QKD generation
schematically. They have information-theoretic security
because they are similar in their security as the plaintext
security under ciphertext-only attacks when the cipher is
used for encryption. Specifically, the generated (running)
key sequence Kr from the cipher with a uniform seed
key Ks, which can be regarded as a pseudo random
number sequence, would have the following probability
of leaking the whole Kr to Eve:
P (kr) = 2
−|Ks| (II.51)
This is obtained because each possible Ks value leads to
a different Kr sequence (non-degenerate cipher), which
may be used in Eq. (1) as the K. It is important to realize
that this is information-theoretic security for Kr, and it
is very favorable for typical values of |Ks| from 100 to
1, 000, as compared to that obtained from the QKD value
(50) with the d values in the literature. For comparison to
QKD, a block cipher can be run in stream cipher mode
for the generation of a running key, as in Fig. 1.
Subset leaks p(k∗r ) depend on the specific conven-
tional cipher. For (non-degenerate) linear feedback shift
registers [3], the level is perfect for a single K∗r sequence
of ≤ |Ks| consecutive bits [6]. In general, the correla-
tions between bits in Kr are difficult to quantify, whereas
a QKD key obtains a security guarantee under (13). In
any case, key expansion symmetric key ciphers do not
have “perfect forward secrecy”[3] due to the correlations
between bits in Kr. Moreover, a QKD-generated key
does not have such secrecy either, especially not at the
large d(K) level given in the literature, because it is
imperfect.
The following numerical comparison of the QKD
system of [59] with only a linear feedback shift reg-
ister (LFSR) cipher against ciphertext-only attacks is
revealing. With a seed key of only 128 bits, the p1(Kr)
level of an LFSR is ∼ 10−40 from (II.51) for any
|Kr|, which compares quite favorably to ∼ 10−9 for
|K| ∼ 105 bits in [59] even before the Markov inequality
is applied for an individual guarantee. The LSFR protects
a segment K∗ of up to 128 consecutive bits with perfect
security, whereas the system of [59] only does so at
the same 10−9 level from (13). It is not known what
the LSFR information-theoretic security is for many
scattered segments K∗, and [59] gives the same 10−9
probability for segments within a block from (50). There
are many other uncertain securities in both systems. It
is also not clear if one is superior to another security
wise. However, it is clear that the LFSR is substantially
faster and cheaper to operate. The numerical comparison
of QKD and symmetric-key ciphers is included in Table
1 of Section VIII.B.
Note that there is no KPA in key expansion until
the expanded key is used in an application because
the plaintext is chosen to be U , at least in principle,
by the encrypter. This is why there is information-
theoretic security in conventional key expansion before
the key is used, given the possibility of KPA. Non-
degenerate symmetric key ciphers in current use do not
have any KPA information-theoretic security because
only a length of |Ks| known input bits together with
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the corresponding ciphertext would uniquely fix Ks in
principle. Security relies on the complexity of locating
Ks. On the other hand, the QKD key remains secure for
sufficiently small d from (23). Note that it may be possi-
ble to obtain information-theoretic security against KPA
with a conventional cipher. The theoretical possibility
is presented in [68, App.], especially when the known
plaintext is not too long.
It has been proposed that the QKD generated key can
be used as the seed key in a conventional cipher. In that
case, the plaintext so encrypted only obtains the protec-
tion of the conventional cipher but worse considering that
Ks is no longer perfect. How the imperfection affects the
conventional symmetric key cipher security is unknown.
In any case, as a pure conventional cipher, there is no
more information-theoretic security against KPA.
C. Relevance of KPA and Kirchhoff’s Principle
We believe the following remarks are important when
comparing QKD with conventional cipher security. In
many specialized applications, it does not seem possible
to launch a KPA, in contrast to most commercial ap-
plications. Examples include military applications with
encryption on board an aircraft, a ship, a satellite, or a
protected ground station. In such cases, it is not clear
what advantage of significance QKD provides compared
to conventional encryption, as discussed in the above
subsection with a numerical example. This is especially
true given that the QKD security advantage has yet to be
rigorously established; in addition, it is inefficient and is
vulnerable to hacking.
More broadly, for such specialized applications, it
is not clear why Kirchhoff’s principle [4] should be
assumed. That principle states that the only security-
relevant feature of the cryptosystem that an attacker does
not know and that the users do is the shared secret
key between the users. The cipher structure and the
encryption algorithm are assumed to be openly known.
This does not appear to be a reasonable assumption
in military situations. If the encryption structure or
algorithm is unknown to the attacker, it appears next
to impossible for her to obtain substantial amounts of
information for any reasonable cipher the users choose
because the possibilities between structures and algo-
rithms are endless and equivalent to a huge number of
shared secret bits. They can be readily and often changed
under software implementations.
Even under KPA and Kirchoff’s principle, there is
no known vulnerability of conventional strong ciphers
such as AES. In specialized applications, a huge number
of seed key bits can be pre-stored. Weaker ciphers
are commonly employed due to their efficiency. The
notable security risks are not from the known strong
ciphers. Is there a serious problem that awaits QKD as
its solution? It appears that efficient bulk encryption of
large (elephant) data flows in optical links is the one
clear area that would benefit from efficient QKD.
APPENDIX III
OBJECTIONS AND ANSWERS
This appendix addresses some possible objections or
concerns on various points of this paper.
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Objection A: Security is a matter of definition. Why
is your definition better than other ones?
Answer: Security is not a matter of definition. The
cryptosystem designer must decide on an acceptable
probability of a successful attack by Eve on any char-
acteristic of the generated key K from a QKD round.
Consider for example K of length 105 bits. If Eve
has a total compromise probability p1(K) 10−10 (for
d = 10−10) of correctly identifying the entire K,
which is substantially larger than the uniform level of
10−30,000, is this acceptable? Suppose that it is not;
then, regardless of the security definition used at any
quantitative level, security is not guaranteed if the total
compromise probability above is not ruled out. This
is formalized by the operational guarantee statement
(OG) in Section III.A. A theoretic security criterion
has to yield operational probability guarantees, which
must be the concern of cryptographic security. Such an
operational guarantee is difficult to obtain and has been
ignored in QKD, except through the incorrect failure
probability interpretation discussed in detail in Section
IV. It is also neglected in some but not all information-
theoretic security studies in conventional cryptography.
In this paper, we detailed some basic operational guar-
antees for the trace distance (statistical distance) criterion
d; however, not all important operational guarantees have
been covered by d. In particular, Eve’s BER, discussed
in Section V.B, is not covered. When Eve identifies K
incorrectly as a sequence, she may still correctly obtain,
say, 60% of the bits, similar to the case whereby the
distribution p(K) is known to Eve with a per bit error
probability of 0.6, which would not be considered a
secure key by most designers. Most designers would
want a proof against such a possibility at any designed
BER level.
There are questions concerning the average versus
worst-case guarantee, average versus individual
guarantee, and security of multiple uses of different
keys at given d levels. These questions are discussed
in Section III.A, V.C, and VIII.B as well as in the
following objections B and C. Note that Eq. (50) with
d = 10−10 implies that many bits and bit segments may
be leaked for operation in one, say, at a key rate of 1
Mbps; see Section VIII.
Objection B: The average instead of the worst case
should be employed in quantifying security leaks.
Answer: For a rigorous assessment of a problem on
performance depending on a parameter Λ, usually, only
a relevant upper or lower bound can be obtained over
the range of values that Λ may take. The worst-case
performance, say, concerning the time complexity of an
algorithm or the security level of a cryptosystem pro-
vides a guaranteed level of performance that may or may
not result from an attack but that cannot be exceeded. If
the parameter Λ has a probability distribution, one can
also discuss the average performance; see Objection C.
However, it may not be meaningful, in the sense
of being applicable to reality, to assign a probability
distribution to what is called a “nonrandom parameter”
[39], which is not described by a probability distribution.
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This may occur when the parameter appears in only
one sample instance with no repeated trials (although
there remains meaning to assign probability to such a
situation in various theories of probability [41], such as
the probability that President John Kennedy was shot
by more than one gunman. The Warren commission
addressed such question. See also Objection C.) In
decision theory, an unknown nonrandom parameter [39]
is then used. This often happens, for example, when the
parameter takes on a continuum of possibility.
In this paper, the unknown parameter is p(k), namely,
Eve’s distribution on the generated key K from her
attack, as presented in Section III.A as well as in the
beginning of Section IV. The function is the parameter Λ
under consideration, the range of which has a cardinality
of the continuum. More significantly, Eve can pick any
attack for which there is no distribution, and in any event,
the users do not know the distribution or if one exists.
Thus, we cannot average over p(k) or p1, the
maximum value of p(k) from Eq. (4). We also cannot
average over the k of a specific p(k) even though that
may make sense if only because we do not know the
value of that specific p(k). Thus, we have to bound p1
as the worst case to provide a valid guarantee.
Objection C: An average can be used for the guarantee
instead of a probability. In particular, there is no need
to apply a Markov inequality to convert an average
guarantee into an individual guarantee.
Answer: Some parameters in QKD do have reason-
able probability distributions, although only for a given
attack in a given round. Thus, the choice of PAC is
taken to be uniform. The known part K1 to Eve of
K in a KPA is specified by the marginal distribution
of K from the joint distribution p(K,Y ) with Eve’s
observation Y . In Section V.C, we detailed the main
reasons why a probabilistic guarantee is more accurate
than an average guarantee. One reason is that the average
has no operational meaning when the total number of
trials (pertaining to that underlying distribution) is small,
similar to the single-trial case. (Think of the above
Kennedy assassination example in objection B.) This
is codified in the statement (OG) in Section III.A on
operational guarantees.
Equally significantly, a finite sample average remains a
random quantity with its own probability distribution. A
probability statement can be made on it to satisfy (OG).
For example, an estimate from variance information
could lead to such an estimate, not further information
on the distribution. The Markov inequality estimates (30)
and (33) from the average alone are weak because no
other statistical information is available.
One may be stuck with a weaker guarantee, such as
the average without a probability statement, and even
simply relying on a single theoretic criterion without
analyzing its proper operational meaning, as has been
the case in QKD until now, if that is all one can obtain.
However, comparing quantitative security on various
characteristics of K to the uniform U is the concern of
rigorous security. A uniform K = U gives far better
and far more detailed security guarantees than does
a trace distance guarantee, especially at the relatively
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large level that can be obtained. At the very least,
it cannot be claimed that the QKD-generated key is
“perfect”, can be made as close to perfect as desired,
or is perfect except for a small probability. The many
problems presented in this paper should make clear the
dangers of such an exaggeration.
Objection D: Distinguishability advantage is a great
criterion in cryptography. Is there a definite counter-
example on why it is not satisfactory?
Answer: Distinguishability advantage is a vague and
very misleadingly phrased security guarantee. As de-
tailed in Section IV.B, it leads to the an incorrect
failure probability interpretation of a statistical distance
guarantee (which the trace distance criterion reduces to
upon Eve’s measurement on her probe) as a definite and
general quantitative consequence. Alone, it serves no
purpose other than what is given mathematically, namely,
a bound on the statistical distance.
In particular, there can be no counter-example until
one gives the quantitative guarantee that derives from
distinguishability advantage. Using the failure probabil-
ity interpretation as its consequence, all the counter-
examples to the failure probability interpretation are
counter-examples to the distinguishability advantage in-
terpretation. These include the examples in Section IV.A
and the KPA counter-example in Section V.A.
Distinguishability advantage as a statistical distance
bound on δE is a useful criterion, as demonstrated
by this paper. It simply does not have the operational
significance that has been ascribed to it. In particular,
the p1(K∗) bound of Eq. (13) that results is the same
for a one-bit subsequence K∗ of K as it is for the
whole K = K∗. This may give the impression that
the cryptosystem is substantially more secure than it
actually is and apparently led to the incorrect failure
probability per bit interpretation discussed in Section
IV.A, which grossly overestimates security.
Objection E: Isn’t your KPA counter-example of sec-
tion V.A not one of known-plaintext attack but one of
chosen-plaintext attack?
Answer: There is no difference between KPAs and
chosen-plaintext attacks for the symmetric key additive
stream ciphers of Fig. 1, and the counter-example con-
cerns such a cipher. This is because the additive key
stream in symmetric key ciphers is blind to the data. A
KPA reveals part of the running key k1 that happens to
be uncovered from the known data x1, with the following
k2 depending on k1 and p(k).
Of course, the δE level provides an average guarantee
over K1, as given in Eq. (23). Thus, a bad k1 can only
occur with a small probability for small δE (which
d reduces to). However, such an average needs to be
removed for an individual guarantee. The incorrect
failure probability interpretation produces an incorrect
answer for a given k1; see Section V.A.
Objection F: The trace distance guarantee may be suf-
ficient in practice. What is the evidence to the contrary?
Answer: This paper is concerned with information-
theoretic security foundation and rigorous proofs of
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security, the latter being proclaimed for QKD for almost
twenty years. It is not clear what is meant by “sufficient
in practice”, which would vary from application to
application. Many problems, including the lack of a
real proof on QKD security, are noted in this paper.
They constitute evidence of possible practical security
problems. There is no such thing as proof by “no
counter-example yet”. The burden is on those who
claim QKD has been proved secure to produce a valid
proof for a given model. It is the task of cryptanalysis,
a major component of cryptology, to scrutinize security,
which is rarely performed in the QKD literature apart
from implementation issues.
Objection G: Why cannot security be brought arbitrar-
ily close to perfect by privacy amplification?
Answer: The trace distance level d(K) is bounded
by (36) in terms of the total compromise probability
p1(K
′) of the shift key K ′. It cannot be made arbitrarily
small from the Leftover Hash Lemma. It is not known
whether there is any way to make only p1(K) arbitrarily
close to the uniform level 2−|K|; see Section VI.A.
In addition, note from Sections III.B and IV before
IV.A that asymptotic vanishing of Eve’s accessible
information or the trace distance not only does not
imply that the key is arbitrarily close to perfect but
also may even imply that the key suffers from a serious
weakness of having a very relatively large p1(K).
Objection H: There is no problem in assigning a
numerical value to f in the error correction cost (39).
This can be taken from the actual ECC used in the
protocol.
Answer: In that case, there is then no need to present
formula (39), which is irrelevant to the actual bit cost.
This conveys the misleading impression that there is a
general justification.
As outlined in Section VI.B, there is a rationale for
(39) when f = 1 because of the asymptotic number
of bits needed to cover a linear ECC for guaranteed
error correction, although only for a binary symmetric
channel, which is not obtained under a general attack.
The point is that correctness of the round (the users agree
on the same key) is then guaranteed. When a finite code
is used with usually a bit cost of even less than (39) for
f = 1, correctness from an ECC cannot be theoretically
guaranteed and must be established with high probability
by other means not given in the security proof of the
protocol. This is acceptable in practice whenever it works
but cannot be confused with a security proof on the
model. The assumption must at least be made clear that
it is not logically incorporated in the security proof.
The more serious problem with error correction is
what is focused on in Section VI.B; it has not been
quantitatively shown how an imperfect key covering the
ECC would degrade security or why the imperfect key
bit cost of any quantitative level can be used to account
for any bit leaks in any reconciliation procedure. Many
unstated and strictly invalid assumptions are used in
QKD security proofs, as outlined in this paper and
in [61], any of which would invalidate any claim to
proven security. The security of QKD protocols requires
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a substantial amount of further careful study.
Objection I: It has not been explained how an im-
perfect key would affect QKD security when used for
error correction and what the overall complexity security
becomes when used in a conventional symmetric-key
cipher.
Answer: The first question is a major open problem
in QKD security theory. The second occurs when a
QKD key is used in ciphers such as AES; however, it
is not very relevant because an imperfect key can only
weaken the complexity security compared to a uniform
key. The substantive question is what the complexity
security becomes if the imperfect seed key is changed
more often compared to a uniform key. Both problems
appear to be very difficult and seemingly not amenable
to analysis.
This paper never claims to address, let alone solve, all
security problems associated with QKD-generated keys.
The paper provides some fundamental results on the
security of any key generation scheme, quantum as well
as classical, and notes some serious unsolved problems.
Whoever claims security has the burden of providing a
valid proof.
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